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THEIR OCCURRENCE  
 
JO-ANNIE CHARBONNEAU* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last five years, three of the four major North American professional 
sports leagues experienced a lockout; the National Football League (NFL) and 
the National Basketball Association (NBA) locked out their players in 2011,1 
while the National Hockey League (NHL) imposed a similar treatment in 2012.2 
Lockouts have proven over the years to provide significant leverage to the 
leagues, the players’ employers, during the negotiation process. Currently, all 
leagues have agreed on a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the  
players associations and are experiencing work peace. However, due to the  
ongoing growth of the sports industry and the exponential amount of money that 
these professional sports leagues and clubs generate,3 there will always be  
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and J.D. from the University of Ottawa (Canada) in 2011 and 2012. She would like to thank Matthew 
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parents, Ginette and Richard, for the unconditional love and support and for allowing her to pursue her 
dreams. A special thanks to her family and friends who have always been there for her. The Author’s 
native language is French, so European spelling is used for some words throughout the Article.  
1. Alexandra Baumann, Play Ball: What Can Be Done to Prevent Strikes and Lockouts in  
Professional Sports and Keep the Stadium Lights on, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 251, 
268 (2012). 
2. Christopher Botta, NHL Lockout: Gary Bettman Is Going Nowhere—No Matter What, SPORTING 
NEWS (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.sportingnews.com/nhl/story/2012-10-29/nhl-lockout-news-2012-
gary-bettman-criticism-hockey-strike-david-stern-retire. 
3. The revenues for the NFL were evaluated at $9 billion for the year 2013.  Monte Burke, How the 
National Football League Can Reach $25 Billion in Annual Revenues, FORBES (Aug. 17, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/monteburke/2013/08/17/how-the-national-football-league-can-reach-25-
billion-in-annual-revenues/.  The NHL revenues were evaluated at $3.7 billion for the 2013–2014  
season.  James Mirtle, Report: NHL Revenues to Hit Record $3.7-Billion, GLOBE & MAIL (June 9, 
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tension between players and club owners, as both want to get a bigger part of 
the revenue. Different reasons motivate them; players seek a bigger percentage 
of the shared revenue because they are the product of the leagues, and the 
leagues, as the employers, seek a bigger percentage of the shared revenue  
because they manage the league. As seen in recent years, lockouts are the most 
common weapon used by leagues to gain leverage during a CBA negotiation. 
In North America, the four major professional sports leagues provide the highest 
level of competition for athletes. The leagues monopolize the market of  
professional sports; currently there are no other valid options for players to  
compete professionally. There are other sports leagues in Europe, but they are 
not as competitive as the leagues in North America. The only league that does 
not have control of the market is Major League Soccer (MLS) because better 
options exist for players in Europe, where the highest level of soccer is played. 
As a result, players and players associations have started bringing actions under 
both antitrust and labor laws to counterbalance this power. The choice to sue 
under a particular law is made once players have been locked out and a CBA 
expires.  
Another consideration that players associations and leagues must take into 
account in the four major North American professional sports leagues is the fact 
that most leagues have teams in two different countries: Canada and the United 
States. The NBA and MLB each have one team in the Province of Ontario. The 
NFL used to have a team that played home games in the Province of Ontario, a 
scenario that could be reproduced because the NFL is open to playing home 
games outside of the United States of America.4 However, the biggest impact 
of this situation is observed within the NHL. Out of the thirty NHL teams, seven 
teams are located in five provinces of Canada: Alberta, British Columbia,  
Manitoba, Ontario, and Québec. The number of Canadian teams could grow in 
upcoming years as Canadian cities have demonstrated an interest to the NHL to 
obtain a hockey team during the new appeal-for-interest process for potential 
expansion. The Canadian teams are important markets for the NHL because they 
                                                 
2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/hockey/globe-on-hockey/report-nhl-revenues-to-hit-
record-37-billion/article19080171/.  The revenues of the NBA were evaluated at $4.6 billion for the 
year 2013.  Kurt Badenhausen, As Stern Says Goodbye, Knicks, Lakers Set Records as NBA's Most 
Valuable Teams, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtba-
denhausen/2014/01/22/as-stern-says-goodbye-knicks-lakers-set-records-as-nbas-most-valuable-
teams/.  The revenues of Major League Baseball (MLB) were evaluated at $8.5 billion for the year 
2013.  Maury Brown, Major League Baseball Sees Record Revenues Exceed $8 Billion for 2013, 
FORBES (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2013/12/17/major-league-base-
ball-sees-record-revenues-exceed-8-billion-for-2013/.  
4. See Kevin Patra, Buffalo Bills Terminate Toronto Series, NFL, (Dec. 3, 2014), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000438147/article/buffalo-bills-terminate-toronto-series. 
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generate a great portion of the NHL’s total revenues.5 Nevertheless, the  
presence of these teams in Canada is enough to require club owners and players 
associations to comply with Canadian laws. During past lockouts, the NHL 
mostly ignored Canadian laws. A similar situation is unlikely to occur again in 
upcoming years. As this Article will establish, Canada has concurrent  
jurisdiction with the United States over professional sports leagues. To  
demonstrate this concurrent jurisdiction, this Article uses the NHL as a case 
study.  
Part II will first analyze the legal issues that arise under labor laws in the 
different provinces of Canada and the federal jurisdiction of the United States. 
In Canada, each province regulates labor relations. The individual provincial 
labor regulations may create difficulties for trans-provincial companies because 
each province is independent in how it controls these relations. In the United 
States, one labor relations law regulates all states. Consequently, labor issues, 
such as procedures to declare a lockout and the remedies to stop a lockout, are 
different throughout Canada and the United States. Part II will explain the  
different laws and the different systems that govern labor laws. Once these laws 
are defined, an analysis of the concurrent jurisdiction between these two  
countries will be provided. Over the years, Provincial Canadian jurisprudence 
has established jurisdiction over labor relations matters that occur in Canadian 
territory. This issue is central to this Article because contrary to what happened 
in the previous lockout, the NHL shall comply with Canadian laws as well as 
American law. Furthermore, Part II will discuss the different claims, arguments, 
and remedies under the labor laws of both countries and the role of concurrent 
jurisdiction in these claims. Concurrent jurisdiction provides opportunities for 
players associations to gain leverage in a work stoppage situation. 
 Part III of this Article will examine the legal issues that arise under the 
antitrust laws in Canada and the United States. In Canada and the United States, 
antitrust is federally regulated. The issues that arise under American antitrust 
law regard agreements between multiple owners to operate a certain way and to 
declare a lockout. The central issue in the United States is when antitrust law 
may be applied because, as long as a league and a players association are in a 
labor relationship, the non-statutory labor exemption applies and antitrust 
claims cannot be brought. Once the labor relationship ends, antitrust claims may 
be a weapon for players to stop a lockout. All of these issues will be addressed 
in Part III. As for the antitrust issue in Canada, because there is no equivalent to 
                                                 
5. See Mike Ozanian, The Most Valuable Teams in the NHL, FORBES (Nov. 25, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2014/11/25/the-most-valuable-teams-in-the-nhl/. The  
revenues generated by the seven Canadian NHL hockey teams were evaluated at $922 million.   
This means that 24.92% of the NHL’s revenue is coming from Canadian teams.  This value does not 
account for broadcasting and sponsorship deals from Canadian corporations. 
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the non-statutory labor exemption, the main problem is evaluating if a lockout 
was the result of a conspiracy.  If a conspiracy is found, the issue is how  
Canadian law is applied to stop a lockout. The laws of both countries will be 
analyzed to set the basis of any possible legal claims. When the principles and 
different claims have been established, arguments and remedies will be  
developed. Concurrent jurisdiction will be addressed in Part III; however, unlike 
labor law, there is no significant difference that will permit a party to gain  
leverage by bringing a claim in one country instead of the other, even though 
the vast majority of antitrust claims are usually brought under American law.  
The main point of this Article is that in recent years, lockouts have occurred 
in multiple professional sports leagues. In each lockout, Canadian laws were 
overlooked because the majority of the professional sports teams are located in 
the United States. In the 2005 NHL lockout, the NHL never considered  
Canadian laws. In the 2012 NHL lockout, the NHL only considered Ontario 
labor relations laws but did not consider the provincial nature of labor relations. 
By locking out its players in 2005 and 2012, the NHL gained unfair negotiating 
leverage.  The lockout was detrimental to the players because they could not 
play; thus, the players did not earn a salary. The salary losses forced the players 
to agree to certain conditions that they might not have agreed to under different 
circumstances, such as the salary cap and the minimum and maximum salaries. 
Nevertheless, even though the NHL has unfair negotiating power, a lockout is a 
legitimate means for the NHL and other leagues to obtain what they want. To 
counterbalance the unfair negotiation power, this Article will demonstrate that 
Canadian laws cannot be overlooked and there are more effective means to fight 
a lockout under Canadian labor laws. Consequently, it is possible for both sides 
to gain leverage at any point during the negotiation process. In terms of antitrust 
law, if a decertification is agreed upon, players will have more effective means 
to fight a lockout in the United States. It is up to the players associations and the 
players to decide which strategy will be more beneficial to them to obtain as 
much leverage as possible. However, it is evident that if the laws remain  
unchanged, the best strategy for players who want to stay unionized will be to 
fight a lockout under labor laws.  
II. LEGALITY OF NHL LOCKOUT UNDER AMERICAN AND CANADIAN LABOR 
LAWS 
A CBA governs the relations between a professional sports league and a 
players association. As a result, club owners and players are bound by it. Labor 
laws regulate the collective bargaining process. Canada and the United States 
have a different set of laws that are not based on the same jurisdiction. However, 
in both countries, it is the players’ decision whether or not to unionize. In the 
CHARBONNEAU ARTICLE  (DO NOT DELETE) 12/16/2015  2:07 PM 
2015]      U.S.  AND CANADIAN AN TITRUST AND LABOR LA WS  115 
United States, labor law falls under federal jurisdiction, while in Canada,  
provinces regulate labor law. Each province has its own set of laws.  
A. American Labor Law 
Labor relations have been tense in the United States as early as the 1920s 
during the Industrial Revolution. At the time, employees did not receive any 
protection for their work. There were no relationships between employees and 
their employers. Employees became upset because of poor working conditions, 
which created a lot of violence. To bring peace into labor relations, Congress 
adopted the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932.6 A few years later, in 1935,  
President Roosevelt enacted a law to regulate all labor relations in the United 
States and permit unionization; this law was entitled the National Labor  
Relations Act (NLRA).7 The NLRA allows workers to unionize, meaning they 
can agree that an organization will be designated as their representative for any 
labor relations dispute with an employer.  
It must be mentioned that Congress established two main premises to  
accompany the NLRA. Congress first said that the government should not  
interfere when the parties negotiate terms of employment in good faith. 8 When 
two parties decide to be bound by a CBA and engage in the collective bargaining 
process, Congress will not get involved. Congress gives full freedom to the  
parties to negotiate the terms they want to include in a CBA, as long as the CBA 
respects the process established in the NLRA. Secondly, Congress stated that 
the bargaining power should be of the same level.9 Through the NLRA,  
Congress meant to level the bargaining power between employers and their  
employees. Even if the bargaining power may never be equal between the two 
sides, the NLRA offers protection to employees and gives them some rights and 
benefits they would not otherwise have. Congress has never intervened in any 
individual labor dispute.  Courts have the authority to review labor relations 
disputes. Courts will leave the parties to negotiate their own CBA. Therefore, 
the remedies under American labor law are limited to administrative and judicial 
claims.  
The NLRA is central to labor relations; it created the National Labor  
                                                 
6. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (effective Mar. 23, 1932).  With this law in place, 
courts were only able to grant injunctions to end strikes involving violence or fraud.  Baumann, supra 
note 1, at 254.  As such, the Norris-LaGuardia Act helped bring some peace to the labor industry. Id. 
7. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).  
8. Michael H. LeRoy, The Narcotic Effect of Antitrust Law in Professional Sports: How the Sherman 
Act Subverts Collective Bargaining, 86 TUL. L. REV. 859, 875 (2012). 
9. Id.  
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Relations Board (NLRB).10 The NLRB’s mission is to enforce the NLRA’s  
provisions, which encompass employees’ rights and ensure good faith  
bargaining from both sides, but mostly from the employers. One of the most 
important powers of the NLRB is to certify unions.11 Under this power, once a 
union is certified as the official bargaining representative of employees to  
negotiate with an employer, no other representative or individual employee may 
do so. As with any other industry, it must be noted that players decide and  
voluntarily choose to unionize. Once a majority of players decides to unionize, 
a labor organization is chosen to represent them. The organization then applies 
for certification with the NLRB. Once this process is achieved and the NLRB 
recognizes the union, the certified union is the only unit that can represent the 
employees to the employer. In professional sports, certification means that 
leagues can only negotiate with players associations; leagues cannot negotiate 
with players individually.12 Once the NLRB certifies a union, the NLRB grants 
the union the right to act on behalf of the union’s members.13 The union and the 
employer are mandated to negotiate a CBA. The NLRB, as a federal agency, 
establishes the mandatory subjects14 that must be negotiated in a CBA. These 
mandatory subjects are wages, hours, and conditions of employment. All other 
legal issues are considered permissive subjects, meaning that an employer and 
union may or may not choose to negotiate these terms. An example of a  
permissive subject is the determination of the negotiators. As it can be noted, 
American labor relations laws are mostly procedural. Consequently, the laws 
provide both parties latitude in their negotiations, allowing them to reach the 
best deal possible. 
In terms of professional sports leagues, the NLRB established its  
jurisdiction to oversee league disputes in the 1970s in American League of  
Professional Baseball Clubs and Ass’n of National Baseball League Umpires.15 
                                                 
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169.  See also Gabriel Feldman, Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA: The 
Shifting Dynamics in Labor-Management Relations in Professional Sports, 86 TUL. L. REV. 831,  
838–89 (2012). 
11. MATTHEW J. MITTEN, TIMOTHY DAVIS, RODNEY K. SMITH & N. JEREMI DURU, SPORTS 
LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 487 (3d ed. 2013). 
12. Morio v. N. Am. Soccer League, 501 F. Supp. 633, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).  In this case, the North 
American Soccer League (NASL) tried to avoid bargaining with the players association and negotiated 
directly with the players. Id. at 637.  The court enjoined the NASL from doing so.  Id. at 640.  It stated 
that the league’s “duty to bargain with the exclusive representative carries with it the negative duty not 
to bargain with individual employees.”  Id. at 639 (citing Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 
678 (1944); NLRB v. Acme Air Appliance Co., 117 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1941)).  
13. MITTEN, DAVIS, SMITH & DURU, supra note 11, at 547. 
14. There are no equivalent mandatory subjects in the provincial laws in Canada. 
15. See generally 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).  In this case, the American League Umpires sought 
recognition as a union, but the league already had a system for self-regulation of umpire disputes.  Id. 
at 190–91. The NLRB concluded in this case that baseball was a business engaged in interstate  
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In this case, the MLB umpires sought recognition of their union by the NLRB.16 
The NLRB established that professional sports affect interstate commerce.17 As 
a result, professional sports should be subject to the NLRB’s jurisdiction.18 The 
NLRB exercised its jurisdiction, even though an MLB club was located in  
Canada.19 Another element the NLRB considered to assert jurisdiction was the 
lack of internal regulation of disputes by MLB.20 The NLRB found that MLB 
solely designed the system, and the system did not include anything on how to 
deal with labor disputes.21 MLB tried to qualify the umpires as supervisors to 
exempt them from the NLRA.22 Its argument was unsuccessful.23 As a result, 
the NLRB took full jurisdiction over the matter and permitted the umpires to 
unionize,24 even though the Major League Baseball Players Association was 
recognized by MLB.  
This decision allowed the players association to be recognized by the NLRB 
as well as its respective league.25 Consequently, the NLRB gave the players 
protection under the NLRA by asserting jurisdiction over labor relations in  
professional sports. The ruling of the case determined that because MLB held 
games in more than one state, MLB engaged in interstate commerce.26 As the 
NLRB stated, “[F]uture labor disputes . . . will be national in scope, radiating 
their impact far beyond individual State boundaries.”27 Also, MLB is an  
industry that relies on interstate travel.28 The NLRB finally mentioned, “The 
Employer’s final contention, that Board processes are unsuited to regulate  
effectively baseball’s international aspects, clearly lacks merit, as many if not 
most of the industries subject to the Act have similar international features.”29  
As a result, the NLRB could derive its jurisdictional power based on that 
particular decision. The NLRB could not avoid deciding a case involving  
                                                 
commerce, meaning that the business was conducted in more than one state.  Id. at 192.  
16. Id. at 190. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 191. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 192. 
23. Id. at 193. 
24. Id. 
25. Gregory Boucher, Baseball, Antitrust and the Rise of the Players’ Association, 2008 DENV. U. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 121, 129 (2008).  
26. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. at 192. 
27. Id.  
28. Id. 
29. Id.  
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professional sports that have the same characteristics. The four major North 
American professional sports leagues are governed by the NLRA, which means 
that the NLRB has jurisdiction to oversee issues deriving from the labor  
relations between leagues and players associations. Based on American  
jurisprudence, the NLRB has jurisdiction to intervene on issues that arise both 
within and outside the United States. To do so, a court must consider the effects 
of the conduct complained about in the United States.  A court must determine 
if the conduct “negated or substantially qualified the presumption against  
extraterritoriality under the NLRA.”30 The effect must be considerable.  
As demonstrated in American League of Professional Baseball Clubs,  
under labor law, it is important to consider some factors that are specific to  
professional sports. One element is multi-employer bargaining, which means 
that a bargaining group is set by a group of employees to represent and bind 
them with a union. In the NHL, multi-employer bargaining means that all club 
owners agree to bargain with one group, the National Hockey League Players’ 
Association (NHLPA) that represents the players, and recognize the NHLPA’s 
power to negotiate and conclude agreements for the players. As a result, the 
NHL clubs bargain as a joint employer. The NHLPA has established that, in 
professional sports, even though clubs operate independently and look to  
enhance their own viability and interest, clubs also need each other for the 
league to function properly and efficiently.31 Clubs need common rules to  
operate and also to further the objective of the league to have competitive  
balance. Competitive balance is an important factor because a league and the 
teams would not generate as much revenue if competition on the ice is not  
high-level and not exciting to spectators. As a result, the NLRB concluded that 
all individual teams constitute a single employer unit in terms of bargaining 
purposes.32 In North American Soccer League, the NLRB discussed how a joint 
employer relationship is formed.33 The criterion is the degree of control one 
employer has over labor relations rules.34 The NLRB found that the NASL had 
enough control over these issues to be recognized as a joint employer.35 Control 
                                                 
30. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, RE: COLBY ARMSTRONG ET AL AND THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE 
PLAYERS ASSOCIATION VS. CLUB DE HOCKEY CANADIEN INC. AND THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE 
(C.M. NO, CM-2012-4431) par. 19 (2012). 
31. See Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248 (1996). 
32. N. Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980).  In this case, the NASL 
disputed the certification that was granted by the NLRB to the National American Soccer League  
Players Association to represent all NASL players of clubs located in the United States.  Id. at  
1380–81.  The court concluded that “a league-wide [sic] bargaining unit as appropriate is reasonable.” 
Id. at 1383.  
33. Id. at 1382. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 1383. 
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is exercised through standard player contracts, the submission of players’  
contracts to the NASL Commissioner, and the NASL’s broad player discipline 
power.36 Consequently, if a league has such control, it will be considered a  
single employer unit.37 
Another element to consider in professional sports is that a league is unique 
in nature and, as mentioned previously, needs the interdependence of the teams 
to conduct an effective business and provide an interesting and relevant product. 
Generally, if employers group together to form a single bargaining unit, the 
grouping would constitute an antitrust violation. The main reason why club 
owners group together is to provide an attractive product to consumers, such as 
exciting games among the member clubs of a league. Under the NLRA, a CBA 
that is negotiated by a multi-employer would not bind the parties unless all the 
parties agreed to it. In the case of the NHL and the NHLPA, the parties  
voluntarily accepted a CBA in 1967. Because this acceptation has not been  
contested, it is an admissible fact that both parties agreed to be bound by the 
CBA. It must be noted that the NHLPA never bargained with an individual club, 
neither in Canada nor the United States. 
The NLRB has the authority to oversee unfair labor practices38 and to  
review the scope of bargaining.39 For example, an unfair labor practice is failing 
to bargain in good faith by either party during the collective bargaining process. 
The duty to bargain in good faith does not, however, include the legal duty to 
submit a reasonable proposal or to agree to any terms. The elements of the duty 
to negotiate in good faith include meeting with the other party to negotiate and 
meeting at a reasonable time. The scope of bargaining over mandatory issues 
includes wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. Any party may 
bring an administrative claim to the NLRB regarding an unfair labor practice 
and the scope of review. Similar arguments, depending on the facts, will be 
brought by either party. As American labor law is highly procedural, one party 
may argue that the other did not follow the proper process during a negotiation. 
The arguments will be related to bad faith bargaining by one party, i.e., delaying 
the process, missing a negotiation meeting, or failing to cooperate. Bad faith 
bargaining is difficult to prove because one fact alone might not be sufficient, 
but the combination of multiple factors may be enough to establish a claim on 
the merits. Anyhow, if an administrative claim before the NLRB fails, a party 
                                                 
36. Id.  
37. Id. 
38. Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (1947).  The Taft-Hartley Act gave the NLRB 
 jurisdiction over unions and employers in regards to unfair labor practices.  Id. 
39. MITTEN, DAVIS, SMITH & DURU, supra note 11, at 486. 
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may bring a similar claim in federal court.40  Either through an administrative 
claim or a judicial claim, a party is typically seeking an order to stop the  
behavior of the other party.  
In the NHL, players considered unionization beginning in the 1950s.41 At 
that time, the players did not have the same working conditions as today. The 
salaries were not the same, and playing conditions were not as good; hockey 
was considered a dangerous physical contact sport because in the 1950s, players 
did not have the same protective equipment as today. Players wanted to obtain 
more guarantees for their life after they retired from the NHL. In 1957, Doug 
Harvey and Ted Lindsay, two NHL hockey players, sued the NHL because it 
refused to give players a pension plan.42 Their efforts were counterbalanced by 
the NHL’s actions. The NHL forced the players’ teams to trade them.43 The 
NHL also forced the Detroit Red Wings to disassociate from the players’  
movement.44 As a result, the first effort to unionize did not work.  
The NHLPA that we know today was formed in 1967.45 The goal of the 
NHLPA was to obtain better salaries and guarantee more protection for the  
players. Bob Pulford, the Executive Director of the NHLPA at the time, ensured 
that the union would be recognized because he met with the owners and asked 
them for recognition and guarantees that players would not be penalized for  
being a union member.46 The owners agreed. Through union representation, 
players obtain the rights and benefits that are provided by the NLRA. The 
NHLPA has the power to collectively bargain an agreement on behalf of the 
players that will set the different conditions of their employment.47 The players 
obtain the right to strike, while the NHL has the right to lockout players.48  
                                                 
40. An unfair labor practice claim is filed with the NLRB.  When the NLRB receives a claim, it will 
investigate the allegations.  Once an investigation is completed, the NLRB will determine if it will 
proceed through consent procedures or formal procedures.  In a consent procedure, the parties waive        
their right to a formal hearing. In a formal procedure, the parties go through a formal hearing.  An 
administrative law judge presides over a hearing.  The administrative law judge will either impose a 
cease and desist order of the unfair labor practice or dismiss the unfair labor practice claim.  If either 
party does not agree or does not comply with the order, a federal court of appeals court may review the 
NLRB’s decision and decide to enforce, set aside, or remand the decision to the NLRB.  
41. Inside NHLPA, NHLPA, http://www.nhlpa.com/inside-nhlpa (last visited Dec. 14, 2015). 
42. Daniel Wyatt, Ted Lindsay and the First NHL Players’ Association, DANIEL WYATT; HIGH ON 
HIST. (July 20, 2013), http://danielwyatt.blogspot.com/2013/07/ted-lindsay-and-first-nhl-players.html.  
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Inside NHLPA, supra note 41.  
46. NHLPA, WATERFRONT BIA, http://www.waterfrontbia.com/directory.asp?idn=1467&pg=10 
(last visited Dec. 14, 2015). 
47. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1947). 
48. Id. 
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Furthermore, the NLRA prohibits employers from sanctioning employees who 
want to unionize;49 as a result, the actions of the NHL in the 1950s would not 
be permitted now. A union permits the creation of a strong force against owners 
or an employer. Multiple employees allow for a stronger voice than one  
employee negotiating alone. 
A players association has a duty to fairly represent any current or  
prospective players. In the NHL, the NHLPA is the labor organization that  
represents the players in their collective bargaining negotiations with the NHL. 
Furthermore, just as the players have the right to choose to unionize, they have 
the equivalent right to forgo union representation at any given point in time. 
There are two ways players can dissolve their union, either through a disclaimer 
of interest or through decertification.50 This process will be elaborated further 
in detail in the antitrust section, as it is an important factor to determine when 
players can bring antitrust claims. 
1. Legal Remedies to Prevent or Stop an NHL Lockout 
Under American labor law, as mentioned previously, there are only two 
ways to bring a claim before the NLRB, either through an unfair labor practice 
or scope of bargaining claim. Both parties, either a league or a players  
association, may bring a claim before the NLRB. In terms of a lockout, only an 
unfair labor practice claim would apply. Section 8(d) of the NLRA imposes an 
obligation on both parties to negotiate in good faith.51 This remedy would be the 
best way for a league to force a players association to negotiate. This would not 
end a lockout, but it would put pressure on a players association and force it to 
sit at the negotiation table, even though players might still be locked out. It 
would be a strong tactic for a league to bring an unfair labor practice claim and 
still lock out the players because the league would gain more bargaining power.  
Taking the 2012 NHL lockout for example, the NHL could have argued that 
the players association was not bargaining in good faith because the players 
filed multiple labor relations claims in different instances, which could be  
defined as an uncooperative negotiation practice. The players looked at  
alternative ways to enjoin the league from locking them out instead of putting 
all their efforts into the negotiation process. The league could have brought a 
claim, even though a lockout was already in place. The league would have 
gained even more bargaining power. This would have been a remedy to counter 
the efforts of the players association’s claims against the league. If the NHL had 
                                                 
49. Id. 
50. Gabriel Feldman, Antitrust Versus Labor Law in Professional Sports: Balancing the Scales After 
Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1256 (2012). 
51. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
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engaged in unfair labor practices, the players association could have also 
brought a claim under this provision.  
Pursuing the same synopsis as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the 
players association could have argued that the league never bargained in good 
faith because it was clear the league intended to lock out the players on a  
particular date. Also, the players association could have argued that the league 
had a history of locking out its players.52 Under the same commissioner, the 
NHL experienced three lockouts. This trend shows that the league used lockouts 
as a common tactic and not as a pressure measure for a particular situation. The 
league knew that a lockout would give it bargaining power, and the league  
decided to lock out the players without negotiating fairly with the NHLPA from 
the beginning. It would be hard for the NHLPA to establish because lockouts 
are a pressure tactic permitted under the NLRA.  
Because the NLRA specifically permits a lockout, there are not many  
remedies that players can bring to prevent or stop a lockout under American 
labor law. As established in American Ship Building Co.,53 a lockout is legal 
even if it is used to put economic pressure on employees. The Court said that 
the “use of the lockout does not carry with it any necessary implication that the 
employer acted to discourage union membership or otherwise discriminate 
against union members as such.”54 Therefore, because the league made its  
intention of locking the players out clear, the argument that the league bargained 
in bad faith may not be a compelling argument to convince the NLRB. It seems 
like the NLRA, which was enacted to help employees gain leverage in the  
bargaining process, gives an employer more power and measures to help  
employees modify their demands. Because a lockout is protected and almost 
impossible to fight under labor laws, it seems that the main goal of the NLRA 
is no longer fulfilled. As a result, due to all the elements mentioned previously, 
it seems that the main goal of the NLRA, to give resources to employees and 
empower them in their relation with their employer, is not fulfilled to the same 
                                                 
52. Pro Sports Lockouts and Strikes Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/us/pro-
sports-lockouts-and-strikes-fast-facts/ (last updated Jan. 28, 2015).  The NHL experienced three  
lockouts since 1992.  The first one was during the 1994–1995 season; this lockout lasted 103 days.  Id.  
The second lockout was during the 2004–2005 season. Id.  This lockout lasted 310 days. Id. The third 
lockout was during the 2012–2013 season. Id. During this lockout, 526 regular season games were 
canceled.  Id.  
53. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 312 (1965).  In this case, the employer who  
operated a shipyard company wanted a new agreement with its unions.  Id. at 302.  When the  
negotiations reached an impasse, the employer closed down one of its yards and laid off some  
employees for a temporary period.  Id. at 303–04.  The employees argued that the employer did so 
because it knew that a strike was coming.  Id.  The employer argued that it did so to support its  
bargaining position and put economic pressure on the employees.  Id. at 304.  
54. Id. at 312. 
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extent as when it was enacted, based on the legality and legitimate means a 
lockout provides to an employer.  
B. Provincial Canadian Labor Law 
The main difference between American and Canadian labor laws is  
jurisdiction. In Canada, the provinces regulate labor law. Each province has its 
own labor relations code or act. Each code or act must be interpreted according 
to the legal system it is subject to. Provincial Canadian labor relations laws  
apply to the players and teams that are located in and provide work services in 
Canada. Even though the NLRB claimed jurisdiction and recognized the  
extraterritoriality of the NLRA, the Canadian labor boards’ decisions must be 
taken into account. Seven of the thirty NHL teams are located in Canada;  
however, all of the Canadian teams generate more revenue than most of the 
American teams.55 Canadian teams also have a gigantic fan base. Even when 
the teams are not playing in Canada, there are huge impacts on revenues,  
sponsorships, and broadcasts. Therefore, in the NHL, it can be argued that the 
main effects of a lockout are felt in Canada. In the last NHL lockout, some  
Canadian enterprises, such as restaurants and souvenir boutiques, surrounding 
the NHL arenas closed due to the lack of business. These main economic effects 
cannot be disregarded. Furthermore, Canadian NHL teams have lucrative  
broadcasting deals. In 2014, the NHL entered into its most lucrative Canadian 
television broadcasting deal with an agreement with Sportsnet to become the 
official broadcaster of the NHL for the next twelve years. The deal was  
evaluated at 5.2 billion dollars.56 Some broadcast television companies make 
most of their revenues from televised hockey games. An NHL lockout results 
in a direct negative impact on television revenues. Based on all of these  
elements, Canadian laws may not be overlooked, although it seems they have 
been overlooked in the previous lockouts.  
1. Québec Labour Law 
The Province of Québec is the only province that has a completely mixed 
legal system of civil and common law. Common law is mostly used for issues 
                                                 
55. Paul D. Staudohar, The Hockey Lockout of 2012–2013, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (July 2013), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/the-hockey-lockout-of-2012.htm.  Jeff Klein established that 
three of the NHL clubs are responsible for the generation of 80% of the NHL revenues.  Id.  Two of 
those clubs are located in Canada, which are Montreal and Toronto.  Id.  Revenue generation in the 
NHL is calculated differently than the other sports leagues, as the revenues are mostly derived from  
attendance and local television agreements, whereas, in other professional sports leagues, revenue  
generation comes from national television agreements.  Id. 
56. Deal Gives Rogers Rights to All NHL Games Through 2025–26, SPORTSNET (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.sportsnet.ca/hockey/nhl/deal-gives-rogers-rights-to-all-nhl-games-through-2025-26/.  
CHARBONNEAU ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE) 12/16/2015  2:07 PM 
124 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 26:1 
that are federal in nature, such as criminal law. On the other hand, labor law is 
under the umbrella of the civil legal system. In Québec, any matters that result 
out of labor law are codified in the Québec Labour Code.57 Originally, the labor 
system was developed on two basic premises: minimum working conditions and 
the autonomy of the parties involved in an employment relationship.58 The latter 
premise is still predominant in the law, meaning that the law recognizes the 
voluntary association of employees, the collective bargaining process, and the 
pressure tactics that can be used by employees.59 
To benefit from certain protections of the Québec Labour Code, a union 
must be certified as the representative of that particular group of employees. 
The employees must take a vote, and the majority must approve the unit that 
will represent them. In this case, for the NHLPA to be the official unit, the  
players would have to vote to elect this organization. Once the vote has passed, 
an application must be filed to obtain certification to the Québec Labour  
Relations Board. When a union is certified, employees may benefit from the 
rights that are provided in the Québec Labour Code. For example, once certified, 
players would acquire the right to strike, which would give the league the right 
to lock out the players. Currently, the NHLPA is not a certified union under the 
Québec Labour Code, which means that the players cannot be locked out and a 
lockout is illegal.  
Another codified provision regards arbitration. The Québec Labour Code 
provides that its dispute resolution system is the exclusive means to settle  
grievances resulting from a CBA. The law is clear on this subject: “Any dispute 
shall be submitted to an arbitrator upon written application to the Minister by 
the parties.”60 Therefore, if the NHLPA were a recognized union under the  
Québec Labour Code,61 the NHL and the NHLPA would have to bring any of 
their disputes to arbitration, not to court. Once a CBA expires, both parties may 
agree to submit their disputes to arbitration; however, it is not mandatory.  
 Another provision that directly applies to professional sports concerns  
organizations with multiple employers. The Québec Labour Code provides that 
multi-employer certification is prohibited. This can be an issue in professional 
sports because a professional sports league is a group of club owners who are 
the employers. To have an efficient league, club owners must work together. 
The multi-employer bargaining unit is pivotal to the NHL because the business 
                                                 
57. See generally Québec Labour Code, R.S.Q. 2009, c C-27 (Can.). 
58. Mathieu Fournier & Dominic Roux, Labor Relations in the National Hockey League: A Model 
of Transnational Collective Bargaining?, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 147, 149 (2009). 
59. Id. 
60. Québec Labour Code, R.S.Q. 2009, c C-27, art 74 (Can.). 
61. See id. 
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of clubs is so intertwined that they need to be governed by the same rules for 
their best interest. One can argue that it would be more complex to have multiple 
bargaining units and unions (i.e., thirty in the NHL); therefore, it is impossible 
to imagine a non-multi-employer bargaining unit. If it were necessary, it would 
mean that under the Québec Labour Code, it would be impossible for the 
NHLPA to be recognized as a certified union, unless it created divisions specific 
for each team. 
During the last NHL lockout, the Montreal Canadiens players brought a  
labor law claim against the Club de Hockey Canadien Inc. and the NHL.62 The 
players claimed the lockout was illegal and sought an injunction to suspend the 
lockout.63 The main argument raised by the Montreal Canadiens players and the 
NHLPA was that the lockout was unlawful.64 Under the Québec Labour Code, 
the Montreal Canadiens players are considered employees based on their  
individual employment contracts.65 The NHLPA is the labor association that 
represents these players.66 However, the NHLPA is not a certified union under 
the Québec Labour Code.67 Concurrent jurisdiction was established because the 
Labor Relations Commission ascertained the matter in front of it. The Québec 
Labour Code applies to employers (i.e., the team) and employees (i.e., the  
players) who work in Québec.68 As a result, in Québec, locking out employees 
is prohibited because they did not acquire the right to strike, as the players  
association is not a certified union. For this reason, “the players and the NHLPA 
asked the [Québec Labour Relations] Board to step in.”69 The NHL argued that 
it was not an employer as defined by the Québec Labour Code.70 According to 
the NHL, the only employer that existed, as defined by the Québec Labour 
Code, was the Montreal Canadiens.71 The Commission des relations du travail 
ultimately concluded the Québec Labour Code applies to everyone and,  
therefore, applied to the current dispute.72  
                                                 
62. Armstrong c. Club de Hockey Canadien Inc., 2012 QCCRT 0445 (Can.).  In this case, the players 
and the NHLPA sought a provisional order to prevent the league from locking the players out.  Id.  The 
order was not granted at the preliminary hearing.  Id.  A final decision was never issued.  Id. 
63. Id.  
64. Id.  
65. Id. 
66. Id.  
67. Id. 
68. Danilo Di Vincenzo & Linda Bernier, The National Hockey League and the Montreal  
Canadiens’ Hockey Club on the Labour Relations Board’s Ice, CANADIAN BAR ASS’N (Nov. 2012), 
http://www.cba.org/CBA/sections_labour/newsletters2012/nhl.aspx.  
69. Id. 
70. Armstrong, 2012 QCCRT 0445. 
71. Id.  
72. Id.  
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The NHL also argued that the Québec Labour Code did not apply because 
the NHLPA was not a certified unit in Québec.73 The NHL then argued that it 
negotiated a CBA with the NHLPA in 1967, so they had a contractual  
relationship since then.74 As a result, one team should not be certified because 
the NHLPA bargained with the league and not individual clubs for many years.75 
The NHL also stated that because the CBA was expired, the NLRA permitted 
such a pressing measure to force the NHLPA to negotiate.76 Finally, the NHL 
argued that the NHLPA’s claims were a demonstration of its bad faith in the 
negotiation process, as it was using the claim only to pressure the league.77 The 
Commission des relations du travail rendered only an interlocutory decision.78 
The parties were convened in that judgment for another ruling on the merits of 
the case.79 The merits of the case were never decided, so there is no basic rule 
to follow in terms of a claim in Québec. Furthermore, the Commission des  
relations du travail did not grant the injunction sought by the players because 
the NHL caused no harm.80  
The Commission des relations du travail’s decision was one of the first 
judgments involving professional athletes that could have opened the door for 
the Commission des relations du travail to decide its jurisdiction and the  
involvement of Québec law in professional sports leagues issues. The  
Commission des relations du travail seemed compelled by the arguments of the 
players and the NHLPA in regard to legal pluralism.81 The Commission des 
relations du travail stated that it has exclusive jurisdiction in labor relations  
matters that occur in Québec.82 However, the Commission des relations du  
travail still needs to decide whether legislation applies in this case. The Québec 
Labour Relations Board will have to establish how legislation applies to the 
NHL. Based on the previous NHL lockout, because the NHLPA was not a  
certified union, it seems that the lockout imposed by the NHL was illegal.  
                                                 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id.  
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id.  The Commission des relations du travail dismissed the application of the players of the Club 
de hockey Canadien Inc. because at the time the application was filed, the criteria to grant an injunction 
was not met, which includes whether there was a serious question, irreparable harm, and preponderance 
of inconveniences. Id. The main criterion that was not met was irreparable harm, as the players did not 
lose any salaries or benefits as of September. Id. The Commission des relations du travail set a date to 
reconvene in October. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
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The arguments brought by both parties were valid. The players rightfully 
argued that the Québec Labour Code applies to them because they work in  
Québec and their employer is located in Québec. However, one issue regarding 
the application of Québec’s legislation might complicate a decision in favor of 
the players. Based on the facts of the 2012 NHL lockout, the lockout was illegal 
because the NHLPA is not a certified union, which means that the players are 
entitled to the same benefits that they would normally have if they were playing. 
The problem is the legality of the lockout outside Québec. According to the 
Québec Labour Code, the lockout would be illegal only in the province of  
Québec. A positive decision from the Commission des relations du travail 
would give the players bargaining power, even though it could invalidate a 
league-wide lockout.  
2.. Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Manitoba Labor Laws 
The four provinces, Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and Ontario, are 
all governed by the common law legal system, meaning that precedent is an 
important factor when deciding a particular issue. For example, because some 
labor comissions and judicial instances already assert jurisdiction over  
professional sports leagues’ labor relations disputes, if a dispute arose in a future 
lockout, a board would have to recognize its jurisdiction. Each of the four  
provinces has adopted statutes that regulate labor relations in its territory, and 
courts in these jurisdictions have more flexibility to adapt the labor relations 
laws to a specific situation.83  
a. Alberta 
The Alberta Employment Standards Code84 applies to every employer and 
employee in Alberta.85 Therefore, the teams located in Alberta, the Calgary 
Flames and the Edmonton Oilers, must comply with the Alberta Employment 
Standards Code. Under the Alberta Employment Standards Code, employers 
must follow certain administrative steps to impose a lawful lockout on their  
employees. The Alberta Employment Standards Code provides for mediation.86 
                                                 
83. Common law courts and instances have more flexibility to adapt the laws, statutes, and  
regulations to the reality because the system allows for the evolution of the law over time. In a civil law 
system, it is more difficult to make the law evolve, and it often requires modification of the law, which 
requires a robust process of legislation.  
84. See generally Province of Alberta Employment Standards Code, R.S.A. 2000, c E-9 (Can.). 
85. Id. art 2(1) (stating, “This Act applies to all employers and employees, including the Crown in 
right of Alberta and its employees.”). 
86. Id. art 73(2)(b).   
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Furthermore, a lockout is permitted only if certain conditions occur, such as 
notice of a lockout, a vote on a lockout supervised by the Division of Labor 
Relations, and the expiration of a CBA.87 If these conditions are not met, a  
lockout may be declared illegal.  
During the 2012 NHL lockout, players from the Calgary Flames and the 
Edmonton Oilers filed a claim with the Alberta Labour Relations Board stating 
that the lockout was illegal in Alberta.88 The players argued that they were  
                                                 
The Registrar may 
(a) initiate any system of appeal management in order to expedite the fair resolution of 
an appeal; 
(b) with the agreement of the parties, appoint or facilitate the appointment of an  
impartial third party mediator, fact-finder or other person to assist the parties in  
settling their dispute; 
(c) design processes to manage appeals that, at the option and with the agreement of 
the parties, may be used to resolve an appeal. 
 
Id. art 73(2). 
87. See Province of Alberta Employment Standards Code, R.S.A. 2000, c L-1, art 73 (Can.).  
 
An employer or employers’ organization is entitled to cause a lockout if 
(a) no collective agreement is in force, other than as a result of section 130, 
(b) a lockout vote was held under this Division 
        (i)    that remains current, 
        (ii)    for which the results have been filed with the Board, and 
        (iii)    that resulted in a majority in favour of a lockout,  
(c) lockout notice is given in accordance with this Division, 
(d) the lockout commences on the day and at the time and location specified in the 
lockout notice or, if an amendment to the lockout notice is agreed to and is permitted 
under this Division, on the day and at the time and location specified in the amended 
lockout notice, and 
(e) in a case where a disputes inquiry board is established before the commencement 
of the lockout, the time limits referred to in section 105(3) have expired. 
 
Id. art 74. 
 
(1) A bargaining agent that is a party to a dispute may apply to the Board to supervise a 
strike vote, and an employer or employers’ organization that is a party to a dispute may 
apply to the Board to supervise a lockout vote. 
(2) No strike or lockout vote shall be supervised while a collective agreement is in force 
unless that agreement is in force pursuant to section 130. 
(3) No strike or lockout vote shall be supervised until a mediator has been appointed under 
section 65 and the cooling-off period referred to in subsection (7) of that section has expired. 
 
Id. art 75. 
88. Edmonton Oilers Hockey Corp. and Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, 2012 CarswellAlta 
1678, para. 2 (Can.).  
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“employees” as defined by the Alberta Employment Standards Code and, as 
such, their rights should be protected, even though the NHL filed for voluntary 
recognition.89 Although the league did file for voluntary recognition, it did not 
receive an answer to assess the legality of the lockout.90 The Alberta Labour 
Relations Board dismissed the claim of the players, stating that because all of 
the steps were not completed, it would not invalidate the lockout.91 Furthermore, 
the Alberta Labour Relations Board did not want to support strategic tactics to 
prevent negotiation discussion,92 believing its involvement would be  
detrimental to the parties’ relationship.93 The Alberta Labour Relations Board 
stated, 
 
The result of such an intervention by this Board would be to 
effectively remove the Calgary Flames and Edmonton Oilers 
teams and players from the league-wide collective bargaining 
process that the parties have historically engaged in and has 
been established and recognized under the NLRA. The Calgary 
Flames and Edmonton Oilers Clubs could not participate in the 
league-wide lockout in which the rest of the League is engaged 
as part of the current collective bargaining process. This is, in 
part, the very reason the British Columbia Labour Relations 
Board refused to grant certification of the B.C. NHLPA in its 
application involving the Vancouver Canucks in Orca Bay.94 
 
As demonstrated, the Alberta Labour Relations Board was reluctant to  
assert jurisdiction over the NHL lockout. However, the fact that the NHL filed 
for voluntary recognition of the lockout supported its argument that it had a 
good faith basis for having the lockout declared legal. The main point to  
remember is that the Alberta Employment Standards Code provides the Alberta 
Labour Relations Board with the possibility to decline or assert jurisdiction on 
matters that happen in its territory. 
                                                 
89. Id. at para. 31. 
90. Id. at para. 28. 
91. Id. at paras. 39, 41. 
92. Id. at para. 40. 
93. Id. at para. 42. 
94. Id. at para. 42. 
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b. British Columbia 
The British Columbia Labour Relations Code95 includes similar provisions 
with regard to mandatory administrative steps that must be fulfilled to have a 
legal lockout. As in Alberta, all employers must vote prior to a lockout.96 This 
                                                 
95. British Columbia Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 244, art 61 (Can.). 
96. Id. art 61(1).  
 
(1) If 2 or more employers are engaged in the same dispute with their employees, a 
person must not declare or authorize a lockout and an employer must not lock out his 
or her employees until a vote as to whether to lock out has been taken by all the  
employers in accordance with the regulations, and a majority of those employers who 
vote have voted for a lockout. 
(2) If on application by a person directly affected by a lockout vote or an impending 
lockout, or on its own behalf, the board is satisfied that a vote has not been held in 
accordance with subsection (1) or the regulations, the board may make an order  
declaring the vote of no force or effect and directing that if another vote is conducted 
the vote must be taken on the terms the board considers necessary or advisable. 
(3) Except as otherwise agreed in writing between the employer or employers'  
organization authorized by the employer and the trade union representing the unit  
affected, 
(a) if a vote is taken under subsection (1) and the vote favours a lockout, a person must 
not declare or authorize a lockout and an employer must not lock out his or her 
employees except during the 3 months immediately following the date of the vote, and 
(b) an employer must not lock out his or her employees unless 
(i) the trade union has been served with written notice by the employer that the  
employer is going to lock out his or her employees, 
(ii) written notice has been filed with the board, 
(iii) 72 hours or a longer period directed under this section has elapsed from the 
time written notice was 
(A)  filed with the board, and 
(B)  served on the trade union, and 
(iv) if a mediation officer has been appointed under section 74, 48 hours have 
elapsed from the time the employers are informed by the associate chair that the 
mediation officer has reported to him or her, or from the time required under sub-
paragraph (iii) of this paragraph, whichever is longer. 
(4) Despite subsection (3) (b) (iii), the board may direct an employer to give more 
than 72 hours' notice of a lockout, on application or on its own motion, for the  
protection of 
(a) perishable property, or 
(b) other property or persons affected by perishable property. 
(5) If the board makes a direction under subsection (4), the board 
(a) must specify the length of the written notice required, and 
(b) may specify terms it considers necessary or advisable. 
(6) If facilities, productions or services have been designated as essential services under 
Part 6 and a lockout that affects those facilities, productions or services does not occur on 
the expiry of the 72 hour period referred to in subsection (3) (b) (iii) or the longer period 
specified under subsection (5), the employer must give to the board and the trade union a 
new lockout notice of at least 72 hours before commencing a lockout. 
CHARBONNEAU ARTICLE  (DO NOT DELETE) 12/16/2015  2:07 PM 
2015]      U.S.  AND CANADIAN AN TITRUST AND LABOR LA WS  131 
vote is subject to the approval of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board 
because the vote must comply with the British Columbia Labour Relations 
Code, including giving seventy-two hours’ notice to the British Columbia  
Labour Relations Board and trade union.97 Furthermore, the majority of  
employers shall vote in favor of a lockout for it to be legal.98 If this  
administrative step is not fulfilled, the lockout is illegal.99 The British Columbia 
Labour Code also provides that both parties must negotiate in good faith,100 a 
duty that is also provided by the NLRA. The jurisdiction of the British Columbia 
Labour Relations Board was challenged prior to the 2012 NHL lockout.  
In 2007, the Orca Bay Club and the NHL asked the British Columbia  
Labour Relations Board to take jurisdiction over the issue that “a separate  
bargaining unit including only the Vancouver Canucks would be an appropriate 
bargaining unit under the Code.”101 The British Columbia Chapter of the  
National Hockey League Players’ Association (BC-NHLPA) sought  
recognition as the official union of the Vancouver Canucks players.102 On the 
other hand, the NHL and Orca Bay argued that “the Canucks players had  
voluntarily chosen to be part of a league-wide collective bargaining  
relationship,” and  during previous negotiations, the players bargained under the 
NHLPA umbrella.103 In the final decision, the British Columbia Labour  
Relations Board was reluctant to intervene between the two parties due to their 
history, the nature of the structure of their relationship, and the way their  
relationship functions.104 It was established that 
 
The Board has no jurisdiction to grant an application for  
certification on any terms other than under the provincial  
legislation; however, where those terms are met, the  
employer’s preference for another bargaining unit  
configuration in another jurisdiction cannot stand as a bar to the 
                                                 
 
Id. art 61. 
97 Id. art 61(3)(b)(iii). 
98. Id. art 61(1). 
99. See id. 
100. Id. art 11. 
101. Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. P’ship v. British Columbia Chapter of the Nat’l Hockey League Players’ 
Ass’n, 2007 CarswellBC 3314, para. 1 (Can.).  In this case, the British Columbia Chapter of the NHLPA 
applied for certification to the British Columbia Labour Relations Board.  Id. at paras. 5–6. 
102. Id. para. 6. 
103. Id. para. 9. 
104. Id. para. 36. 
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Board exercising its jurisdiction under the Code.105  
 
The British Columbia Labour Relations Board established that it has  
jurisdiction over the employees and employers working in British Columbia.106  
In its decision, the British Columbia Labour Relations Board determined that 
the NLRB did not have the power to certify a bargaining unit in Canada and it 
also did have the power to prevent labor organizations from applying for  
certification.107 Therefore, even though the NHLPA is not a certified unit in 
British Columbia, the British Columbia Labour Relations Board can still look 
at disputes that implicate them.108  
It is clear that even though the NLRA applies to the relationship between 
the NHLPA and the NHL, the law of British Columbia still applies and the  
British Columbia Labour Relations Board may review labor relations disputes 
in British Columbia. Nevertheless, as it was explained in Edmonton Oilers 
Hockey Corp. & National Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, the British  
Columbia Labour Relations Board did not get involved in the labor disputes to 
avoid involvement in labor relations that implicated actors other than just the 
Vancouver Canucks players and the club owner.109 This is a crucial element of 
the British Columbia Labour Relations Board’s holding because by not  
intervening, it would have given almost full jurisdiction to its counterpart, the 
NLRB.  
c. Ontario 
In the Province of Ontario, the Ontario Labour Relations Act110 regulates 
labor relations. The Ontario Labour Relations Act applies to all persons who 
work in Ontario.111 Its jurisdiction over professional sports personnel who  
provide work services in the province has been established in multiple cases; 
two of these cases are highly important to the subject discussed in this section. 
In a case involving an MLB team, the Toronto Blue Jays, regarding the use of 
replacement umpires, the Ontario Labour Relations Board decided that the  
umpires were working regularly and customarily in Ontario. This meant that the 
                                                 
105. Id. para. 35. 
106. See Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. P’ship & NHLPA, 2005 CarswellBC 4555, para. 29 (Can.). 
107. Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. P’ship v. British Columbia Chapter of the Nat’l Hockey League Players’ 
Ass’n, 2007 CarswellBC 3314, para. 35 (Can.). 
108. See id. para. 29. 
109. Edmonton Oilers Hockey Corp. & Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, 2012 CarswellAlta 
1678, para. 42 (Can.). 
110. See generally Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1995, c. 1 (Can.). 
111. Id. 
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Ontario Labour Relations Act applied and the Ontario Labour Relations Board 
had jurisdiction over the players and the teams working in its territory.112 In 
National Basketball Referees Ass’n v. National Basketball Ass’n,113 the Ontario 
Labour Relations Board upheld an analogous decision. 
The Ontario Labour Relations Act provides multiple steps that must be  
encountered prior to declaring a legal lockout when no CBA is in place.114 One 
step is mandatory conciliation. In such a case, the Minister of Labour will  
appoint a conciliation officer or a mediator.115 Within fourteen days of this  
appointment, the conciliator reports to the Minister of Labour regarding the  
endeavour.116 The conciliator determines if the parties are reconcilable. If so, 
the conciliator can allow them to get back into the collective bargaining process. 
Following the meeting, this person shall produce a report to the Minister of  
Labour. The report is produced to the Ontario Labour Relations Board, which 
determines if a conciliation board should be appointed. If it is advisable,  
meaning that there is a window for the collective bargaining process to continue, 
                                                 
112. Ass’n of Major League Umpires v. Am. League & Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 1995 
CarswellOnt 1524, para. 13 (Can.).  In this case, the Association of Major League Umpires filed an 
unfair labor practice claim against the American League and National League of Professional Baseball 
Clubs and the Toronto Blue Jays Baseball Club.  Id. at para. 1.  The Ontario Labour Relations Board 
found that labor relations are subject to the application of the Ontario Labour Relations Act.  Id. at para. 
13.  Furthermore, it stated that an umpire who worked regularly and customarily in Ontario is an  
employee as defined in the Ontario Labour Relations Act.  Id.  Consequently, “Any lock-out of umpires, 
at this time, in the Province of Ontario would be unlawful in Ontario because neither the Leagues nor 
the Umpires' Organization have triggered the compulsory conciliation process which is mandatory in 
this province before a lawful strike or lock-out can occur.”  Id.  
113. 1995 CarswellOnt 1620, para. 21. This case followed the lockout of the NBA’s  
referees by the NBA for the 1995–1996 season.  Id. at para. 11.  The Ontario Labour Relations Board 
decided that it had jurisdiction over the dispute because a team was located in Ontario, Canada.  Id. at 
para. 16.  Therefore, the referees worked in Ontario.  Id. 
114. R.S.O. 1995, c. 1, art 79(2). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. art 20(1).  
 
(1) Where a conciliation officer is appointed, he or she shall confer with the parties and 
endeavour to effect a collective agreement and he or she shall, within 14 days from his or 
her appointment, report the result of his or her endeavour to the Minister. 
Extension of 14-day period 
(2) The period mentioned in subsection (1) may be extended by agreement of the parties or 
by the Minister upon the advice of the conciliation officer that a collective agreement may 
be made within a reasonable time if the period is extended. 
Report of settlement 
(3) Where the conciliation officer reports to the Minister that the differences between the 
parties concerning the terms of a collective agreement have been settled, the Minister shall 
forthwith by notice in writing inform the parties of the report. 
 
Id. art 20. 
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a conciliation board will be appointed and a lockout shall not be declared during 
the process. However, if the report states that it is not advisable to appoint a 
conciliation board, the Minster of Labour will authorize the lockout. One  
particularity of this provision is voluntary recognition of the conciliation  
process. Written consent must be filed with the Ontario Labour Relations Board, 
which may decide to accept or refuse the consent.  
During the 2012 NHL lockout, the Minister of Labour in the Province of 
Ontario, in his full discretion, gave permission to the Toronto Maple Leafs and 
the Ottawa Senators to lock out their players.117 As such, the NHL did not have 
to go through all the administrative steps to have a legal lockout. If the NHL did 
not apply for voluntary recognition, the NHL would have needed to fulfill all 
the administrative steps required by the law.118  
d. Manitoba 
It must be mentioned that a seventh team, the Winnipeg Jets, is located in 
Winnipeg, Manitoba.  Like all of the other Canadian provinces discussed,  
Manitoba enacted its own labor relations law, the Labour Relations Act.119 The 
law applies to NHL players who work in Manitoba because it is where they are 
employed. During the 2012 NHL lockout, the NHLPA and the players of the 
Winnipeg Jets did not file a suit to block the lockout; the NHLPA was still  
exploring options, but it did not follow through.120 There are some particular 
provisions in the Manitoba Labour Relations Act that could help the players 
association. The main provision that could create issues with the NHL is article 
87.1.121 This provision provides that either side may apply, in writing, to the 
                                                 
117. Sean Rainey, Is a Possible NHL Lockout Even Legal in Canada?, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 11, 
2012), http://dailycaller.com/2012/09/11/is-a-possible-nhl-lockout-even-legal-in-canada/. 
118. See R.S.O. 1995, c. 1, art 79(2). 
119. Manitoba Labour Relations Act, C.C.S.M. 1988, c. L-10 (Can.). 
120. Dave Stubbs NHLPA Looks to Quebec Labour Law to Halt Lockout, NAT’L POST (Sept. 10, 
2012), http://news.nationalpost.com/sports/nhl/nhlpa-looks-to-quebec-labour-laws-to-halt-lockout. 
121. R.S.O. 1995, supra note 118, art 87.1.  
 
Where a collective agreement has expired and a strike or lockout has commenced, the  
employer or the bargaining agent for a unit may apply in writing to the board to settle the 
provisions of a collective agreement if 
(a) at least 60 days have elapsed since the strike or lockout commenced; 
(b) the parties have attempted to conclude a new collective agreement with the  
assistance of a conciliation officer or mediator for at least 30 days during the period of 
the strike or lockout; and 
(c) the parties have not concluded a new collective agreement. 
 
Id. art 87.1(1). 
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Manitoba Labour Relations Board to ask them to settle the terms of a CBA.122 
An application may be made once at least sixty days have passed since the  
beginning of a lockout.123 This could be an interesting tactic that should be  
analyzed by the players. The Manitoba Labour Relations Board has sole  
discretion to accept the application.124 The Manitoba Labour Relations Board 
has the power to require the parties to submit to conciliation, if it believes that 
the parties are negotiating in good faith and could come to an agreement within 
thirty days.125 The Manitoba Labour Relations Board will try to leave the  
collective bargaining process in the hands of the parties.126 However, if the  
Manitoba Labour Relations Board decides to accept the application following a 
request to settle the terms of a CBA, these terms will be binding for one year.127  
Other issues may arise if the players in Manitoba file such a claim because 
the Manitoba Labour Relations Board would settle the terms of a CBA. The 
settled terms would directly impact the other NHL players and teams because 
the NHLPA and the NHL would have to comply with the terms of the CBA in 
Manitoba. The critical determination in such a process would be defining the 
bargaining unit and which players are covered by it. It is unlikely that such an 
application would be filed, but it could be a measure to gain leverage in a  
negotiation process. 
e. Concurring Jurisdiction of Provincial Canadian Labor Law and American 
Labor Law 
In all of the common law provinces, a claim may be brought to a labour 
relations board. The NHLPA will try to argue that a lockout is illegal based on 
the different provincial Canadian labour relations laws. The NHL brought a  
similar jurisdictional argument, stating that the respective provincial labour  
relations laws did not apply to the relationship between the NHL and the 
NHLPA.128 The NHL’s arguments relied almost strictly on previous practices, 
mentioning that it always did business that way and the provincial Canadian 
labour relations boards never interfered with the previous negotiations.129  
                                                 
122. Id. 
123. Id. art 87.1(1)(a). 
124. See id. art 87.1(1). 
125. Id. art 87.2(1). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. art 87.3(5). 
128. Grant Goeckner-Zoeller, Note, Extraterritorial Lockouts in Sports: How the  
Alberta Labour Board Erred in Declining Jurisdiction over the NHL, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 101, 121 
(2013). 
129. Id.  
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However, many decisions, such as Ass’n of Major League Umpires and Orca 
Bay Hockey Ltd. Partnership, support the position that the provincial labor  
relations laws applied—in addition to the NLRA—even if the boards ultimately 
decided not to intervene.130 Challenges have been brought before labor boards 
in Canada.  
Furthermore, the NLRA might be enforced in Canada. To do so, a  
provincial Canadian board must decline jurisdiction or establish that the NLRB 
is better suited to deal with a specific issue than the courts or boards in  
Canada.131 However, even if the NLRB exercised its jurisdiction in Canada, it 
cannot override Canadian laws. The NLRB must consider provincial Canadian 
laws in its decision. Canadian laws must be respected, which means that the 
NHL should comply with all the administrative procedures to respect the laws 
previously mentioned. On the other hand, the NHLPA’s main argument would 
be that the NHL did not fulfill all of the administrative steps that were required 
by the law to declare a legal lockout.132 During the last NHL lockout, only the 
prior requirements to declare a lockout were fulfilled in Ontario, and that is only 
because the law provides voluntary recognition. Otherwise, none of the  
administrative steps in any of the other provinces were fulfilled, meaning that 
the 2012 NHL lockout would have been illegal. Due to concurrent jurisdiction, 
as established by different labour relations boards, a league must respect the 
laws in place in the Canadian provinces. Over the years, concurrent jurisdiction 
has been at the center of all disputes. Canadian labour relations boards tend to 
agree with the players association regarding jurisdiction; however, some  
provinces, such as Alberta, have been reluctant to enforce their jurisdiction.133  
                                                 
130. Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. P’ship v. British Columbia Chapter of the Nat’l Hockey League Players’ 
Ass’n, 2007 CarswellBC 3314, para. 35 (Can.); Ass’n of Major League Umpires v. Am. League & 
Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 1995 CarswellOnt 1524, para. 13 (Can.). 
131. Club de Hockey Canadien Inc. Ligue Nationale de Hockey c. Ass’n des Joueurs de la Ligue 
Nationale de Hockey, 2005 QCCRT 0621 (Can.).  During the 2004–2005 lockout, the players filed a 
claim with the Commission des relations de travail (the Québec Labour Relations Board).  Id.  The 
claim was denied based on forum non conveniens, stating that the NLRB would be the proper forum to 
hear labor relations issues between the NHL and the NHLPA.  Id. 
132. Id. 
133. An application was brought by the NHLPA, Chris Butler, Matt Stajan, Michael Cammalleri, 
Blake Comeau, Derek Smith, Tim Jackman, Dennis Wideman, Jarome Iginala, Sam Gagner, Nick 
Schultz, Shawn Horcoff, Ryan Whitney, Eric Belanger, Corey Potter, Mark Giordano, Mikael  
Backlund, Ryan Smyth, Mikka Kiprusoff, Devan Dubnyk, Ryan Jones, Henrik Karlsson, Cory Sarich, 
and Alex Tanguay, affecting the Edmonton Oilers Hockey Corp., the Calgary Flames Hockey Club, 
and the National Hockey League. See generally ALTA. LAB. REL. BOARD, AN APPLICATION BROUGHT 
BY THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, (2012), http://oil-
ers.nhl.com/v2/ext/pdf/NHLDecision.pdf.  
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3. Provincial Labor Law Remedies to Prevent or Stop an NHL Lockout 
In terms of remedies under labor laws, due to concurrent jurisdiction,  
Canadian labor laws offer more ways to end a lockout. In the 2012–2013 season, 
the NHL lockout was considered legal in Québec, at least according to the  
Québec Labour Relations Board’s interlocutory decision.134 However, a lockout 
would be illegal in Québec if the NHLPA was recognized as a certified union 
under the Québec Labour Code. A lockout would also be illegal in Alberta,  
British Columbia, and Ontario if the NHL did not fulfill the required  
administrative steps to declare a legal lockout in these three provinces. 
Because Canadian jurisprudence has demonstrated interest in intervening in 
labor relations between the NHL and the NHLPA, if the NHLPA brings a suit 
in Canada, its negotiating power will likely increase. This tactic would put  
pressure on the NHL to negotiate in good faith and find solutions that would 
accommodate the NHLPA. The burden of a suit in Canada would be more  
detrimental to the NHL because it is time-consuming and the risk of having the 
provincial Canadian labour relations boards assert jurisdiction is increasing 
every year. By pursuing claims under provincial labour relations law, allowing 
the boards to enjoin the NHLPA’s claims, and obtaining injunctions against the 
NHL, Canadian teams will face even greater monetary losses than their  
counterparts in the United States.135 If such a claim is recognized in Canada, the 
teams would have to pay their players during the regular season. One of the 
reasons why the injunction was not granted in 2012 in Armstrong is that there 
was no irreparable harm. Because the NHL season starts in October, the players 
did not experience any loss or damages by not playing. The claim was decided 
on September 21, 2012. The result of that claim might have been completely 
different if the claim was decided in November. Therefore, if a lockout were 
determined to be illegal in Canada, club owners would have to pay their players 
during the season, even though no revenues are generated. This could influence 
the negotiation, as not all the teams can afford to pay their players if no revenues 
are generated. Another consequence, more specifically under Québec law, is 
that penal provisions could apply. The NHL would have to pay a separate fine. 
Provincial Canadian labour laws cannot be disregarded. For this reason, the 
NHLPA may be able to invalidate or suspend a lockout under provincial  
Canadian labor laws, unless the NHL would fully comply with the requirements 
of these laws. These claims are ways to pressure the NHL, but nobody can avoid 
                                                 
134. Armstrong c. Club de Hockey Canadien Inc., 2012 QCCRT 0445 (Can.). By  
dismissing the provisional order and maintaining the interlocutory decision, the  
Commission des relations du travail kept the status quo on the work conflict, which means that until 
further decision from the Commission, the lockout was legal at this moment in time. 
135. Ozanian, supra note 5. 
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the law.  
To resolve conflicts between the different jurisdictions, the NHL would 
have to ensure that it complies with provincial Canadian labour relations laws. 
It was demonstrated earlier that Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario require 
employers to fulfill administrative steps prior to declaring a lockout. In Ontario, 
it seems, as the NHL did in a previous lockout, that the league could apply for 
voluntary recognition and the conciliation process would be aborted; therefore, 
this step would be recognized and would permit the league to declare a legal 
lockout. In British Columbia, there is no equivalent to voluntary recognition. To 
prevent claims being brought before the British Columbia Labour Relations 
Board, the NHL would have to take a vote to declare a legal lockout. Once the 
vote is taken, the board could permit a lockout. In Alberta, the same  
administrative steps must be fulfilled. The only step that would be an issue is 
mandatory mediation. This criterion is the hardest to fulfill. Usually,  
demonstrating that both parties reasonably tried to negotiate may fulfill this 
step; both parties can send their representatives. Normally, after an information 
session on mediation, the parties can both agree to abort this step. Finally, in 
Québec, the issue is certification. It might not be possible for the NHLPA to 
obtain certification. The main problem is establishing who the labor unions 
should represent by determining the proper bargaining unit and members.  
Furthermore, it is prohibited in Québec to have multi-employer bargaining. As 
a result, a lockout would not be legal in Québec. This could create problems 
because the players who are working regularly in Québec would still be paid.  
Consequently, provincial Canadian labour laws offer effective means for 
players to suspend the lockout and maybe accelerate the negotiation process and 
gain some leverage in negotiations. Provincial Canadian labour relations boards 
have jurisdiction to hear disputes that arise in their territories. The remedies 
provided are, nonetheless, limited. As established in Edmonton Oilers Hockey 
Corp. and Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. Partnership, the labour relations boards do not 
want to intervene in the collective bargaining process because their intervention 
would be detrimental to the historical relationship between the NHL and the 
NHLPA. Even though the laws offer effective means to prevent a lockout in 
Canada, it is unlikely that a judgment in favor of the players in Canada would 
enjoin a league-wide lockout. However, a judgment in favor of the players in 
Canada would give leverage to the NHLPA in its negotiations with the NHL.  
III. LEGALITY OF NHL LOCKOUT UNDER AMERICAN AND CANADIAN 
ANTITRUST LAWS 
Antitrust laws have become more important in recent years, such as when 
the NFL players decided to disclaim interest in their union during the 2011 NFL 
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lockout because they felt it was the only way for them to end the lockout.  
Disclaiming interest in a union is a process where players vote to renounce  
representation by their players association. Following this disclaimer, the NFL 
Players Association (NFLPA) members that were non-unionized players sued 
the NFL based on antitrust laws. Not long after this suit, different groups of the 
NBA Players Association (NBAPA) filed antitrust lawsuits in California and 
Minnesota federal courts. However, the NBAPA’s litigation did not go as far as 
the NFLPA because the NBA players settled before going to court. Nonetheless, 
arguments were brought under antitrust laws, and these arguments will be  
explained in this section.  
A. American Antitrust Law 
The Sherman Act regulates antitrust in the United States.136 Courts have 
enforced the Sherman Act over the years, and these courts have developed some 
exemptions to adapt the Sherman Act to the unique business of sports. Antitrust 
is described as the illegal restraint of trade that occurs from a contract.137  
Antitrust laws promote procompetitive behaviors and, therefore, prohibit  
anticompetitive behaviors.138  
1. The Sherman Act 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act “prohibits monopolies and restraint of 
trade.”139 It specifically states that it is illegal to restrain trade or commerce  
between states by contract.140 To establish a violation of section 1, three  
elements must be established: concerted action, interstate commerce, and  
unreasonable restraint of trade. A concerted action is found when it is  
established that an agreement was made among the institutions that are being 
sued for antitrust violations. In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football 
League, the court stated: “The key is whether the alleged ‘contract,  
combination …, [sic] or conspiracy’ is concerted action—that is, whether it 
joins together separate decision-makers.”141 In terms of professional sports 
leagues, concerted action is easily demonstrated, as almost all the agreements, 
rules, and regulations that a league adopts are the result of an agreement between 
                                                 
136. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006). 
137. Antitrust Labor Law Issues in Sports, SPORTS L., http://sportslaw.uslegal.com/antitrust-and-
labor-law-issues-in-sports/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2015). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. 560 U.S. 183, 195 (2010). 
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club owners.  
Interstate commerce is also an element that is easily established. All  
professional sports leagues have teams that are located in different states across 
the country. Each team plays against each other. During their work, players must 
travel to other states. The main business of a professional sports league has  
effects in multiple states. Consequently, the interstate commerce element is  
established.  
The third element that must be established by a claimant under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act is an unreasonable restraint of trade. American Needle142  
established that, to demonstrate this element, a rule of reason analysis must be 
performed. A plaintiff must demonstrate the anticompetitive effects of the rule 
that the plaintiff is complaining about. This first part requires a plaintiff to show 
an adverse impact on competition in a relevant market. The application of the 
relevant market analysis was provided in Fraser v. Major League Soccer 
L.L.C.143 In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football 
League (Raiders I), the plaintiff contested the decision to not allow the  
relocation of an NFL franchise.144 The court established that there are two  
markets that must be analyzed, the product market and the geographic market.145 
The product market is what the employer and the employees are producing.146 
In Raiders I, one party argued that the product was NFL football, while the other 
defined the product as being all entertainment options.147 The geographic  
market is the region in which the product is performed.148 Again, in Raiders I,149 
one party defined the market as being the Southern California region, while the 
other defined the market as the United States.150 Leagues will always tend to 
define the market in the broadest way possible because the larger the market, 
                                                 
142. Id. at 186. 
143. See generally 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002).  MLS operates the major soccer league in North 
America.  MLS has the power to bargain agreements and operates the league on a daily basis.  Its tasks 
include, not exclusively, recruitment, payment of salaries, negotiation, and signage of agreements with 
broadcasters.  In this case, Fraser, an MLS player, objected to the control of MLS over the players and 
alleged violations of antitrust laws, such as Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.  Id. at 60.  The court 
had to conduct a market analysis to determine if MLS monopolized the industry of soccer.  See  
generally id. Fraser failed to demonstrate that MLS controlled the geographic and product market.  Id. 
at 55.  In this case, the geographic market for elite soccer players was worldwide, not just North  
America, as argued by the players. Id. 
144. 726 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). 
145. Id. at 1392. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 1393. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
CHARBONNEAU ARTICLE  (DO NOT DELETE) 12/16/2015  2:07 PM 
2015]      U.S.  AND CANADIAN AN TITRUST AND LABOR LA WS  141 
the harder it is for a court to find that the league has control.  
Once the first part of the rule of reason is established, the burden of proof 
shifts to the defendant who must show a procompetitive justification for the 
imposition of the contested rule. Courts have accepted several procompetitive 
justifications. Competitive balance has been a justification that has been highly 
accepted by courts, as noted in American Needle.151 Another justification that 
has been accepted is financial stability. In Sullivan v. NFL,152 the court  
mentioned that if a rule permits the league to function efficiently and prevent 
detrimental financial effects, it should be recognized as having a procompetitive 
effect. Financial integrity and competitiveness are important aspects of a league. 
To generate maximum revenues, club owners must work together for the best 
interest of a league.  
 If a defendant is able to prove a procompetitive justification for the  
challenged rule, the burden of proof shifts again to the plaintiff, who must  
establish that the restraint is not necessary to achieve the procompetitive  
justification. In Sullivan,153 the court found that there were other less restrictive 
means for the NFL to achieve its goal, such as “modifying the NFL’s policy to 
permit a club’s sale of minority, nonvoting shares of team stock to the public 
with limits on the size of an individual’s holdings.”154 
Finally, a jury will have to balance the positive and negative effects of a 
restraint. If the restraint of trade is found to have a net anticompetitive effect, 
the conduct will be declared illegal.155 However, if the net effects are found to 
be procompetitive, the conduct will be found legal,156 and there will be no  
antitrust violation.  
Professional sports teams have been found to be interdependent of each 
other. Economically, they cannot function properly if the league has multiple 
CBAs. Teams need to collaborate to negotiate a CBA that will apply to all of 
the teams. As a result, because teams have to work together for a league’s  
benefit, teams are engaged in concerted action. Moreover, in professional 
sports, teams are located in different states, as well as different countries.  In 
American League of Professional Baseball Clubs,157 it was established that 
                                                 
151. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010). 
152. Sullivan II v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1112–13 (1st Cir. 1994).  In this case, the 
challenged NFL policy regarded the prohibition of the sale of an ownership interest through a public 
stock offering.  Id. at 1095. 
153. Id. 
154. MITTEN, DAVIS, SMITH & DURU, supra note 11, at 429. 
155. Antitrust Labor Law Issues in Sports, supra note 137.  
156. Id. 
157. 180 N.L.R.B. 190, 190 (1969).  “Baseball, like the other major professional sports, is now an 
industry in or affecting interstate commerce . . . .”  Id. 
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sports leagues are engaged in interstate commerce.  
The NHL, for example, is present in seventeen states in the United States 
and five provinces in Canada. Therefore, the main analysis to establish an  
antitrust violation will be based on the arguments brought to fulfill the  
requirements of the rule of reason test. In contrast with federal labor law,  
antitrust law permits employees to eliminate competition among the teams by 
unionizing. As previously established, there are two types of exemptions under 
antitrust laws: statutory exemptions resulting from the Clayton Act and the  
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the non-statutory exemption. 
In terms of antitrust, the defenses that are usually raised, and that were used 
in Brady158 and Anthony,159 are related to the application of the Sherman Act. 
One of the main defenses under antitrust law is that a league is a single entity 
incapable of violating the Sherman Act;160 leagues claim that because sports 
teams are interdependent, they should receive special treatment in terms of  
antitrust.161 Sports are a unique business; teams must agree on common ground 
rules for a league to function. As a result, it would be inappropriate if antitrust 
laws applied to the interdependence of teams. Another argument that is  
intrinsically linked to the first part is, that because of the interdependence of 
teams, their actions would never pass an antitrust analysis;162 therefore, a league 
should be exempt to protect the function of the league. Another argument that 
has been used by leagues is that the rule of reason analysis places a strict burden 
on the defendant and it is an unreasonable rule for the professional sports  
industry.163 However, this argument has been rejected because the rule of reason 
can be adapted to specific industries. 
To win an antitrust claim, players must argue that allowing a league to lock 
out players would constitute an irreparable harm,164 and, therefore, leagues 
should not be allowed to do so. To establish this point, players must demonstrate 
that the Sherman Act applies to the professional sports industry. In a broader 
sense, players must argue that the Sherman Act applies to all agreements among 
the employers (i.e., the teams) that restrain trade in the labor market.165 The 
                                                 
158. See generally Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011). 
159. See generally Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand, Anthony v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 
No. 11-05525 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2011), https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/califor-
nia/candce/4:2011cv05525/247629/1. 
160. Feldman, supra note 50, at 1267. 
161. Id. 
162. Id.  
163. Id. at 1225. 
164. STEPHEN F. ROSS, SUMMARY OF LEGAL ISSUES ARISING IN THE CURRENT NFL LABOR 
DISPUTE 8 (n.d.).  
165. Id.  
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Sherman Act was enacted to protect everybody from anticompetitive behaviors. 
Secondly, players will have to demonstrate that the rule of reason analysis is a 
straightforward standard that can apply to all industries,166 including  
professional sports. This test has been applied over the years and has been  
flexible enough to apply to all industries. This analysis has already been used in 
the sports industry, as it was applied in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,167 as well as in McNeil v.  
National Football League.168 Another argument that has been raised is that the 
statutory labor exemption does not protect an unreasonable restraint of trade 
when workers waive their labor rights and do not negotiate a new CBA.169 In 
this instance, players will argue that because their CBA expired, antitrust  
scrutiny applies to prevent anticompetitive behaviors. Also, players are allowed 
to benefit from antitrust protections because a certified union does not cover 
them. For all of these reasons, players will argue that the Sherman Act applies 
and that the leagues’ behaviors are an illegal restraint of trade.  
2. Statutory Labor Exemption 
The Clayton Act170 provides the statutory labor exemption. The main  
section that applies to professional sports is section 17.171  The first section  
provides that employees can group together and form a union, or in the case of 
professional sports, a players association. It allows an employer in professional 
sports to negotiate a CBA that will apply to all employees—all prospective and 
current players. Once a union is formed and recognized by the NLRB, it  
becomes protected from antitrust suits. The antitrust immunity applies to a  
union only in limited cases. The designed labor organization must act in its own 
interest. It shall not group with another labor organization. If it does, the  
statutory labor exemption will not apply. The statutory labor exemption  
supports free collective bargaining and gives the parties the opportunity to  
bargain for their own CBAs that will regulate their working relationships.  
3. Non-Statutory Labor Exemption 
The non-statutory labor exemption was created to give full effect to the 
NLRA. The exemption was developed to allow labor processes to work to the 
                                                 
166. Id. at 3. 
167. 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984).  
168. See generally 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).  
169. Feldman, supra note 50, at 1240. 
170. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006). 
171. Id. 
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fullest. Antitrust should not undermine this process. For example, in the NHL, 
the organization is comprised of member clubs located in different states and 
provinces. If the members chose to voluntarily group under one umbrella and 
follow labor relations law, these decisions should be enforced. These groups 
should not be limited by antitrust in terms of labor relations; this is why the  
non-statutory labor exemption was developed. Historically, courts developed 
the non-statutory labor exemption to ensure that labor laws regulate labor  
relations,172 as established in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,173 where the Court 
broadly construed the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption. In this case, 
a group of NFL players filed an antitrust claim against the football club  
owners.174 The CBA expired in 1987.175 In 1989, the parties were still  
negotiating.176 The NFL presented a developmental squad plan to the players 
that would introduce a weekly fixed salary for squad players.177 The NFLPA 
disagreed.178 The negotiation reached the point of impasse.179 Therefore, in June 
1989, the League unilaterally implemented the development squad plan.180 The 
main issue in that case was whether the players could bring an antitrust claim.181 
The Court decided that because the matter satisfied the four criteria, the  
non-statutory labor exemption applied182: “Th[e] conduct took place during and 
immediately after a collective-bargaining negotiation. It grew out of, and was 
directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process. It involved a 
matter that the parties were required to negotiate collectively. And it concerned 
only the parties to the collective-bargaining relationship.”183  Brown clearly 
stated that the non-statutory labor exemption applies so long as there is a  
collective bargaining relationship. For the non-statutory labor exemption to  
apply, there must be a sufficient period of time that indicates a clear end point 
in the relationship.184 The Court did not set a particular end point or period to 
define when the exemption applies.185  
                                                 
172. MITTEN, DAVIS, SMITH & DURU, supra note 11, at 603. 
173. See generally 518 U.S. 231 (1996).  
174. Id. at 235. 
175. Id. at 234. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 235. 
180. Id. 
181. See generally 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
182. Id. at 250. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
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The non-statutory labor exemption no longer applies when a collective  
bargaining relationship dissolves. At this point, either party can bring an  
antitrust claim. Prior to this point, the non-statutory labor exemption immunizes 
the terms of the expired CBA from any antitrust challenge beyond impasse  
because of the ongoing collective bargaining relationship. Therefore, to bring 
an antitrust claim, a players association must end the collective bargaining  
relationship. The most effective way to end a collective bargaining relationship 
is through decertification, which allows a players association to bring a class 
action claim under the antitrust laws. The non-statutory labor exemption  
applies, generally, as long as there is an ongoing collective bargaining  
relationship186 and the parties keep their respective status. However, a  
disclaimer of interest or a decertification on the part of the players and a players 
association might change the application of this exemption. It appears that a 
disclaimer of interest might not be enough for the non-statutory labor exemption 
to apply; however, through decertification, it is definitely possible for the  
players to bring an antitrust claim.187  
In Brady, the players voted to disclaim interest in their union. This  
procedure was not strong enough to end the collective bargaining relationship, 
which is why their request was denied. Statutory exemptions provide immunity 
for a union’s unilateral actions that further players’ economic interests. As a 
result, when players unionize, a league does not have to worry about antitrust 
claims. However, without a union, any antitrust claim is possible. 
4. Brady v. National Football League188 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was adopted to prevent courts from issuing  
injunctions to end strikes, except in cases of violence or fraud.189 The  
Norris-LaGuardia Act also allows employees to unionize and organize  
themselves to form a labor organization that will represent the interests of the 
employees in negotiations with an employer.190 In Brady v. National Football 
League,191 the court, pursuant to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, prohibited federal 
courts from issuing injunctions for lockouts that grew out of labor relations.192 
Furthermore, the court stated that to have a labor dispute, there is no need to 
                                                 
186. Id. 
187. See generally Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011). 
188. Id. 
189. Baumann, supra note 1, at 254. 
190. Norris La-Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
191. Brady, 644 F.3d at 661. 
192. Id. at 680–81. 
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establish the existence of a union (i.e., a players association).193 The Eighth  
Circuit concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives a federal court of 
power to issue an injunction prohibiting a party to a labor dispute from  
implementing a lockout of its employees.194 However, an injunction cannot be 
granted for a lockout as a means to pressure the employees in the negotiation 
process.195 
Brady was decided in 2011.196 The CBA between the NFL and the NFLPA 
was set to expire on March 11, 2011.197 The NFL expressed publicly that if an 
agreement was not reached by the termination date, the NFL would lock out its 
players.198 The players, who were aware of the NFL’s strategy,  
disclaimed interest in the NFLPA on the expiration date of the CBA.199 As  
previously mentioned, there are two ways to dissolve a union. The first way is 
through a disclaimer of interest, which is an informal procedure, whereby the 
players indicate their disinterest in being represented by their union by a  
majority vote.200 The second way is by a decertification process, which is a  
formal procedure through the NLRB.201 All represented players must vote,  
under NLRB supervision, to decide whether they want to decertify the union.202 
If the players have a majority, the players will go through the formal process of 
decertification. Once the union is decertified, no union can represent the players 
for a period of twelve months.203  
 Following this process in Brady, the players filed an antitrust suit, claiming 
that the NFL engaged in a group boycott and a price-fixing agreement, which 
was a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.204 The NFL locked out the 
players on March 12, 2011.205 As a result, the players asked the district court, 
through a preliminary injunction, to enjoin the lockout because it would cause 
                                                 
193. See id. at 675. 
194. Id. at 680–81. 
195. Id. 
196. See generally 64 F.3d 661. 
197. Id. at 663. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. MITTEN, DAVIS, SMITH & DURU, supra note 11, at 619. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663. 
205. Id. 
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the players irreparable harm.206 The court granted the players the injunction.207 
Consequently, the NFL appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.208 
The majority of the Eighth Circuit panel209 concluded that the injunction did 
not comply with the Norris-LaGuardia Act.210 The court went through an anal-
ysis of the plain language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.211 Section 101 of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act states that “[n]o court of the United States . . . shall have 
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent  
injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.”212 The court 
concluded that, even though the players disclaimed interest in the NFLPA, the 
disclaimer did not end the labor relationship. As a result, the issue at stake grew 
out of a labor dispute.213 The majority also analyzed section 104 of the  
Norris-LaGuardia Act.214 The central point of the analysis was the consideration 
of the employment relationship.215 Section 101 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
confirmed that an employer and an employee might be in an employment  
relationship.216 As a result, the court concluded that section 4(a)217 prohibits a 
federal court from issuing an injunction to stop a lockout that is being imposed 
by an employer.218  
Further, the court mentioned that an employer lockout is part of the  
“‘interplay of the competing economic forces.’”219 The NFL’s argument was 
that the disclaimer of interest, on the same day as the expiration of the CBA, 
was mostly a sham.220 The court responded to this argument by stating: 
                                                 
206. Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998 (D. Minn. 2011).  In their submissions 
for an injunction, the players argued that “[t]hey [we]re [s]uffering, [a]nd [would] [c]ontinue [t]o 
[s]uffer, [i]rreparable [h]arm” in the form of money damages; the irreparable harm to the players would 
outweigh the harm to the NFL; “[t]he [p]layers . . . [e]stablished [a] [f]air [c]hance of [s]uccess on [t]he 
[m]erits;” and “[t]he [p]ublic [i]nterest [did] [n]ot [f]avor [t]he ‘[l]ockout.’” Id. at 1034, 1038–39, 1041. 
Consequently, the preliminary injunction was granted. Id. at 1043. 
207. Id. 
208. See Brady, 644 F.3d 661. 
209. The three-judge panel majority was comprised of two judges.  See generally 644 F.3d 661. 
210. Id. at 661. 
211. Id. at 679–80. 
212. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
213. Brady, 644 F.3d at 673. 
214. Id. at 675–76. 
215. Id. at 676.  
216. 29 U.S.C. § 101. 
217. 29 U.S.C. § 104. 
218. Brady, 644 F.3d at 680–81. 
219. Id. at 678 (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40 
(1957) (emphasis omitted)). 
220. Id. at 667.  
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Given the close temporal and substantive relationship linking 
this case with the labor dispute between League and the Players' 
union, we struggle at this juncture to see why this case is not at 
least one “growing out of a labor dispute”—even under the  
district court's view that union involvement is required for a  
labor dispute. 221 
 
Therefore, the distinction between a disclaimer of interest and a  
decertification is crucial to determine when antitrust claims may be brought. 
With respect to the district court, a clear decision should have been rendered 
with regard to requirements to stop the non-statutory labor exemption from  
applying. A disclaimer of interest should not be enough to permit an antitrust 
law claim. A decertification should be the only mechanism available to the  
players who file claims under antitrust law. It is the only permanent  
mechanism that ends the labor relations between players and a players  
association, and consequently, between a league and players association.  
In his dissent, Judge Bye stated that by voting to end the NFLPA’s status, 
the collective bargaining relationship terminated.222 Because the relationship 
ended, the players were allowed to bring an antitrust claim.223 The judge pointed 
out that the main issue was the endpoint of the relationship, which made a clear 
demarcation between antitrust and labor law.224 The disclaimer of interest was 
sufficient, in his view, to end the collective bargaining relationship, even though 
with a disclaimer the players may decide to re-unionize at any point in time.225  
As previously demonstrated, it seems problematic to validate a disclaimer 
of interest to put an end to the labor relationship between a players association 
and a league. A disclaimer of interest does not completely end the relationship 
between the players and a players association. The players may reclaim their 
interest at any point in time after their original vote. Consequently, it would be 
unfair for a league to allow the players to benefit from labor law and antitrust 
law and then benefit again under labor law. As a result, only decertification 
should be considered the end point of a labor relationship to allow antitrust law 
to apply.  
                                                 
221. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 791–92 (8th Cir. 2011). 
222. Brady, 644 F.3d at 687. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 685. 
225. Id. at 687. 
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5. Use of Antitrust Law to Enjoin a Lockout: Unresolved Issues  
Antitrust claims, such as the claims made by the NFL and NBA players,226 
are a good way to put pressure on a league. Even though Brady established that 
a lockout could not be enjoined because the players used a disclaimer of interest, 
a decertification might allow players to obtain an enjoined lockout from a court. 
The main barrier prohibiting players from obtaining an injunction under the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act is the demarcation between labor law and antitrust law. 
Once there is an endpoint in the labor relationship, there is no doubt that an 
injunction may be obtained. A disclaimer of interest is not sufficient to obtain 
an injunction, as a disclaimer does not clearly end a relationship because it is 
always possible for players to re-unionize. Consequently, in a potential future 
lockout, even if the players disclaim interest in their union, they would probably 
not gain the leverage they are seeking in a negotiation. The only way to gain 
leverage would be to decertify their union and then file an antitrust claim. It 
seems that decertifying a union would be highly efficient for players to gain 
bargaining power. Moreover, if the players obtain an injunction, it would likely 
enjoin a lockout and allow them to have access to their training facilities and 
earn salaries. 
In terms of jurisdiction, American law has generally prevailed. Through  
antitrust law, players seek an injunction from a court that will enjoin a league’s 
imposed lockout because it violates section 1 of the Sherman Act. Through  
antitrust claims, players could seek to recover damages for their lost revenues. 
Nevertheless, in Brady the main purpose of the antitrust claim was to obtain an 
injunction to stop the lockout. In Brady, the district court decided in favor of the 
players.227 The Eighth Circuit vacated this decision because the injunction  
violated the Norris-LaGuardia Act.228 The discussion regarding the recovery of 
damages due to an anticompetitive lockout is still open for discussion. Under 
the rule of reason analysis, it is possible that in a future claim, players will be 
able to recover damages.  
B. Canadian Competition Law 
In Canada, antitrust is a matter of federal jurisdiction. The Competition 
                                                 
226. See generally id.; Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 159.  In these two cases, 
players from both the NBA and the NFL sued the leagues and sought an injunction to enjoin the  
lockouts.  Brady, 644 F.3d at 663; Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 159, at 24.  In 
the first instance, the NFL received a positive decision from the court.  Brady, 644 F.3d at 682.   
However, courts have shown some openness to the arguments of the players. This is one of the reasons 
why antitrust claims are remedies for players to gain leverage in a lockout.  
227. Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998 (D. Minn. 2011). 
228. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663 (referencing Norris La-Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006)).  
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Act229 encompasses most of the principles that are found in the Sherman Act. 
The Canadian Competition Act applies to professional sports, as well as to all 
citizens. The Competition Act is the federal Canadian law that regulates  
antitrust. It contains both civil and criminal provisions.230 The Competition  
Bureau of Canada enforces the Competition Act.231 The purpose of the  
Competition Act is to “expand opportunities for Canadian participation in world 
markets while at the same time recognizing the role of foreign competition in 
Canada.”232 The three important sections of the Competition Act are article 48.1 
(Conspiracy Relating to Professional Sport)233 and articles 45 and 90.1  
(Agreements or Arrangements that Prevent or Lessen Competition  
Substantially).234 Article 48 was integrated into the Competition Act in 1976, 
                                                 
229. See generally Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 (Can.). 
230. See generally id. 
231. Our Organisation, COMPETITION BUREAU (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.competitionbu-
reau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00125.html. 
232. Id. art 1.1; Our Legislation, COMPETITION BUREAU, http://www.competitionbu-
reau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00148.html (last modified Jan. 11, 2012). 
233. R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, art 48. 
 
(1) Every one who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with another person 
(a) to limit unreasonably the opportunities for any other person to participate, as a 
player or competitor, in professional sport or to impose unreasonable terms or  
conditions on those persons who so participate, or 
(b) to limit unreasonably the opportunity for any other person to negotiate with and, if 
agreement is reached, to play for the team or club of his choice in a professional league  
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable on conviction to a fine in the discretion of 
the court or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both. 
(2) In determining whether or not an agreement or arrangement contravenes subsection (1), 
the court before which the contravention is alleged shall have regard to  
(a) whether the sport in relation to which the contravention is alleged is organized on 
an international basis and, if so, whether any limitations, terms or conditions alleged 
should, for that reason, be accepted in Canada; and  
(b) the desirability of maintaining a reasonable balance among the teams or clubs  
participating in the same league. 
(3) This section applies, and section 45 does not apply, to agreements and arrangements 
and to provisions of agreements and arrangements between or among teams and clubs  
engaged in professional sport as members of the same league and between or among  
directors, officers or employees of those teams and clubs where the agreements,  
arrangements and provisions relate exclusively to matters described in subsection (1) or to 
the granting and operation of franchises in the league, and section 45 applies and this section 
does not apply to all other agreements, arrangements and provisions thereof between or 
among those teams, clubs and persons. 
 
Id. 
234. Id. arts 45, 90.1.  
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and the goal was to permit professional sports leagues to subsist in Canada.235 
Through this exception, the government recognizes the particularities of  
professional sports leagues.236 It acknowledges that sports are unique and they 
often involve an international aspect because all of the major professional sports 
leagues have teams in two North American countries.237 The Competition Act 
also recognizes teams within a league as a single economic unit238 because 
teams need to work together for leagues to function properly and preserve  
competitive balance. Therefore, due to this entwinement between clubs, the 
rules of competition do not apply as strictly to professional sports leagues.  
Moreover, professional sports leagues are usually international in nature. 
As a result, article 48 of the Competition Act was added to also accommodate 
foreign jurisdiction to include sports leagues performing in different countries, 
states, or provinces, including Canada.239   Courts have used the reasonableness 
standard to determine if an action violates the Competition Act.240 There are two 
components of the standard: “(i) whether the sport is organized on an  
international basis and, if so, whether any limitations, terms or conditions  
                                                 
(1) Every person commits an offence who, with a competitor of that person with respect to 
a product, conspires, agrees or arranges 
(a) to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of the product; 
(b) to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the production or supply of 
the product; or 
(c) to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or supply of the 
product. 
 
Id. art 45(1).  
 
(1) If, on application by the Commissioner, the Tribunal finds that an agreement or  
arrangement — whether existing or proposed — between persons two or more of whom 
are competitors prevents or lessens, or is likely to prevent or lessen, competition  
substantially in a market, the Tribunal may make an order 
(a) prohibiting any person — whether or not a party to the agreement or arrangement 
— from doing anything under the agreement or arrangement; or 
(b) requiring any person — whether or not a party to the agreement or arrangement — 
with the consent of that person and the Commissioner, to take any other action. 
 
Id. art 90.1(1). 
235. J. Kevin Wright & Jonathan Gilhen, A Note on U.S. Antitrust Law and Professional Sport: 
American Needle and the Implications for Canadian Competition Law, 23 CANADIAN COMPETITION 
REC. 66, 71 (2010). 
236. See id. 
237. Id. at 72. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
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alleged should, for that reason, be accepted in Canada, and (ii) the desirability 
of maintaining a reasonable balance among the teams or clubs participating in 
the same league.”241 The Competition Act gives sports leagues flexibility in the 
management of sports.242 As long as the limitations on competition are  
necessary and reasonable, there will be no violation of antitrust.243 It appears 
that “agreements relating to the granting and operation of franchises that have 
the effect . . . of unreasonably limiting participation in professional 
sports . . . are likely subject to [article] 48.”244 Scholars have mentioned that as 
long as the leagues use regulations and agreements that are necessary to the 
particular function of the league, player and franchise restraints are an  
acceptable limitation.245 It is important to mention that article 4 of the  
Competition Act exempts CBAs from the act.246 This exemption is similar to 
the exemption that was developed in Brown v. Pro Football Inc., but the  
meaning of the Competition Act gives a broader exemption in Canada.247  
Nevertheless, it has usually been interpreted that Article 4 does not apply to 
article 48; otherwise, article 48 would be irrelevant.248 However, once a CBA 
expires, because there is no longer an agreement between an employer and an 
employee, it seems like article 4 of the Competition Act would apply; therefore, 
competition claims could be brought.  
The general provision of the Competition Act prohibits ancillary restraint 
of trade; the general provision states that it is “unlawful . . . to agree to fix 
prices,” and “control the supply of a product,” among other prohibitions.249  
Under the general regime, there will be a violation only when the persons  
involved are competitors.250 Article 90.1 includes agreements between  
competitors that do not fall into the provision of article 48, such as intellectual 
property agreements and broadcasting.251 Even though there is a specific regime 
to professional sports, it is limited to certain agreements.252 For all other  
                                                 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 73. 
246. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, art 4(1)(c) (Can.). 
247. Stephen F. Ross, The Current State of Labour Relations in the National Hockey League, 
COMPETITION BUREAU (Oct. 9, 2012), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/Ross/Current_State_of_La-
bour_Relations_in_the_NHL.pdf. 
248. Id.  
249. Wright & Gilhen, supra note 235, at 73.  
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. See id. 
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agreements, the general regime shall apply.253 In terms of lockouts, the section 
that will be used is article 48, which is the specific section that applies to  
professional sports situations.254  
It is important to note that articles 45, 48, and 90.1 cannot “be used to set 
aside a [CBA].”255 Article 4 of the Competition Act states: 
 
[C]ontracts, agreements or arrangements between or among 
two or more employers in a trade, industry or profession, 
whether effected directly between or among the employers or 
through the instrumentality of a corporation or association of 
which the employers are members, pertaining to collective  
bargaining with their employees in respect of salary or wages 
and terms or conditions of employment [are not subject to the 
Competition Act].256  
 
Article 4 is similar to the non-statutory labor exemption that is provided in 
American antitrust law. However, because the Canadian courts have not had 
many opportunities to interpret this section, some issues have not been  
discussed. For example, it is not clear if the section applies to professional sports 
leagues and CBAs that govern in the United States and Canada. If article 4 were 
to apply, it would render the application of the other sections under the  
Competition Act unnecessary. However, one can also argue that once a lockout 
occurs and no CBA is in place, either party may bring an antitrust claim under 
articles 45 or 48 of the Competition Act. It does not appear that a claim to  
establish the validity of a lockout has been brought under the Competition Act 
involving professional sports. Under the Competition Act, the validity of a  
lockout would be subject to a softer test than under American law, as it would 
be subject to the reasonableness analysis. It is unlikely that players would  
succeed in this avenue, as article 48 of the Competition Act was created to  
exempt professional sports from the normal principles that apply to other  
                                                 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. Yashin v. Nat’l Hockey League, 2000 CarswellOnt 3278, para. 44 (Can.).  In this case, the 
NHLPA initiated a grievance on behalf of Alexei Yashin against the NHL.  Id. para. 1.  The issue at 
stake was whether Yashin’s contract expired on June 30, 2000, which would have allowed him to be a 
free agent on July 1, 2000.  Id. para. 33.  However, because Yashin decided to sit out during the  
1999–2000 season, the team alleged that Yashin owed it a season prior to becoming a free agent.  Id. 
para. 22.  Jurisdiction and restraint of trade were alleged in this case.  Id. paras. 27, 43.  The court stated 
that it had “no basis for the proposition that Section 48 of the Competition Act can be used to set aside 
a collectively bargained agreement.”  Id. para. 44. 
256. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, art 4(1)(c) (Can.). 
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businesses.  
IV. POTENTIAL REMEDIES TO PREVENT FUTURE LOCKOUTS 
With the growing business of the sports industry and the fact that it  
generates more and more revenue each year, it is obvious that other lockouts 
will occur or be used as a tool to pressure players associations during  
negotiations. Lockouts are a legitimate, legal tool that may be used by a league, 
but they should not be unduly used. Therefore, it is important to find solutions 
to avoid future lockouts. A lockout gives leagues negotiating power. Even with 
all of the remedies that players may use, they will never possess the same level 
of power, unless the players strike. Players are the essential product of  
professional sports leagues. The relationship between a league and the players 
should be collaborative. One of the main issues that must be addressed in future 
negotiations is concurrent jurisdiction. The best way to avoid conflict would be 
for both parties to agree on a jurisdiction and establish that all matters are  
subject to the NLRA. However, it is not possible to agree to circumscribe other 
countries’ laws through a CBA, so even though this would be an ideal solution, 
it might not be realistic.  
The NHL and the NHLPA should collectively bargain a post-CBA  
procedure in future negotiations. A post-CBA procedure would not waive the 
NHL’s right to impose a lockout; rather, it would be a process between the  
expiration of the CBA and a lockout or strike. This procedure would permit an 
internal mechanism to comply with Canadian laws, while conserving the rights 
provided in the NLRA. The current NHL CBA257 does not provide any  
particular process in regards to what should happen once it expires. Article 7 of 
the NHL CBA, regarding lockouts, only mentions that a lockout cannot be  
declared when the current CBA is in effect.258  
The future CBA should include terms of the current CBA that will remain 
in effect until a new CBA is negotiated. The provision should include an  
exception that would permit the CBA to comply with American laws and allow 
the terms of the CBA to change after impasse. If included, the parties could then 
include a provision that would submit the CBA to a specific jurisdiction.259 This 
solution would be efficient only if both parties agree to it. The provision would 
                                                 
257. See generally COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE 
AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION (2013),                                                                                    
http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/CBA2012/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf. 
258. Id. art. 7.1(b) (stating, “Neither the League nor any Club shall engage in a lockout during the 
term of this Agreement.”). 
259. The contractual legal implications and obligations have not been analyzed during research for 
this Article. Extensive research should be done to establish a more detailed procedure and explanation 
of the legal consequences of such an approach. 
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be in effect only until a second cycle of collective bargaining.  
A solution for the NHL to avoid multiple claims in different jurisdictions, 
if it still wants to use lockouts as an efficient tool, would be to create a formal 
procedure that the league is required to follow prior to declaring a lockout. As 
previously determined, to have a legal lockout in Canada, a league must fulfill 
administrative requirements. Part of the administrative requirements would be 
satisfied if a league has an internal procedure, such as the one proposed in this 
Article. The first step of the proposed procedure would include a mediation or 
conciliation process. Because the procedure affects both parties, it would have 
to be collectively bargained for or mutually agreed upon. If the parties reach an 
impasse during the negotiation, the parties would bring their dispute through the 
mediation or conciliation process. The process does not force the parties to come 
to an agreement, but it would require discussions between the parties.  
Furthermore, having a neutral advisor would provide another perspective. The 
parties would have to agree on which party would pay for the mediation or  
conciliation. One proposition would be that the party who declares the work 
stoppage would pay for a mediator or conciliator’s fees.  
The mediation or conciliation process would serve as a step in between  
negotiation and complete rupture of negotiations. A neutral party would  
determine if there is any way to restart the negotiations. The neutral party should 
be a sports labor relations expert, whom the parties pick from a list of names. 
This first step would meet the mandatory mediation requirement under the  
Alberta Employment Standards Code and show the intention of good faith  
bargaining as provided in the British Columbia Labour Relations Code. It would 
also give leverage to a league when it asks the Ontario Minister of Labour to 
voluntarily recognize a lockout. The second step prior to declaring a lockout 
would be to provide prior notice, which would satisfy one of the requirements 
of the Alberta Employment Standards Code. The internal policy would indicate 
a delay upon which notice must be sent prior to declaring a lockout. The third 
and final step would be for club owners to vote on whether a league should lock 
out its players. Even if the vote is not a supervised vote by any of the provincial 
labour relations boards, a formal vote would support an argument that the club 
owners put their best efforts into fulfilling all of the administrative steps that the 
Canadian labour laws require. As a result, a players association would not be 
able to challenge a lockout as illegal in these Canadian provinces. The league 
would maintain the leverage it is attempting to obtain through a lockout.  
Another avenue that both parties should explore is American or Canadian 
legislation reform. Both parties should work towards a modification of the  
Sherman Act, section 26b (Application of antitrust laws to professional major 
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league baseball).260 All major professional sports leagues in North America  
operate the same way as MLB. After including all of the professional sports 
leagues under section 26b, the leagues should then seek to incorporate a  
provision that would incorporate a statutory exemption to remedy the issue of 
the non-statutory exemption. A provision regarding the beginning point of the 
application of the Sherman Act should be defined. The title of this subsection 
could be “The Application of this Act,” and the section could read,  
 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act shall apply to professional 
sports leagues after a labor relationship between a players  
association and a professional sports league terminates. With 
respect to the labor relationships between players associations 
and a professional sports league, the relationships will be  
considered terminated once (1) a collective bargaining  
agreement expires; and (2) a union representing the players is 
decertified.  
 
The creation of this section would give a clear advantage to a league when 
negotiating because it would allow a league to negotiate without the burden of 
a potential antitrust claim. This section would also give some benefits to players 
because they would have a specific section that would allow them to obtain an 
injunction. Once the protection of labor law no longer applies, players could use 
an injunction as a strategy against a league. However, players would need to 
decertify their union to begin this process.  
Another option for a league is reform of provincial Canadian legislation to 
include the process of voluntary recognition that exists under the Ontario  
Labour Relations Code and the Alberta Employment Standards Code. Adding 
this process under the British Columbia Labour Relations Code would facilitate 
the process of declaring a lockout. The only concern a league would face is 
filing for voluntary recognition in due time. In Québec, the issue is not exactly 
the same. During the lockout in Armstrong, the players sought to be recognized 
as employees and have the NHLPA recognized as a valid union under Québec 
law. A league cannot force a players association to be a recognized union, and, 
even if this practice was allowed, it does not mean that it would be accepted by 
the Commission des relations du travail. As such, a league may seek to add an 
exemption in the Québec Labour Relations Code for professional sports.  
A potential solution to enjoin a lockout that could give leverage to  
players, if none of the legislative reforms proposed are implemented, is an  
                                                 
260. 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2014). 
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antitrust claim. As demonstrated previously, if players are not unionized, they 
may pursue a claim under the Sherman Act, and historically, players have been 
successful in doing so. The main issue is determining when players can bring 
such a claim. There is currently a grey area in establishing whether a disclaimer 
of interest is sufficient to permit an antitrust claim. Brown established that  
decertification of a union permits players to challenge a league for antitrust  
violations. However, if players decide to proceed through a disclaimer of  
interest, it might not be enough. The particularity of a disclaimer is that players 
may decide to unionize and de-unionize whenever they want.  
There is no limitation regarding when a labor relationship terminates. As a 
result, it seems that a disclaimer of interest would be advantageous to a league, 
while a decertification would be an advantage for players. This process must be 
done carefully because once players decertify their union, the players cannot be 
represented by a union for a period of twelve months, which would mean that 
leagues and clubs could negotiate individually with players. An antitrust claim 
gives leverage to players because decertification can be costly to a league, which 
might force a league to settle, and as a result, agree to the demand of the players 
who now have a negotiating advantage.  
There is no perfect solution that would satisfy both parties. However, in the 
long term, legislative reform is the best possible solution because reform would 
create specific legislation regarding only professional sports.  
Professional sports are a unique business that cannot be compared to other  
industries because the revenues and expenses at stake are not comparable. In the 
short term, a league should review the provincial Canadian labour laws and 
lobby to modify them because reducing the avenues for a players association to 
enjoin a lockout would allow a league to gain leverage in future CBA  
negotiations.  
In the long term, both a league and a players association should lobby to 
reform American antitrust law. This process should be in conjunction with the 
other professional sports leagues that would be affected by the reform, including 
the NBA and the NFL. Reform would be a long and thorough process, but it 
would be beneficial to both parties and would reduce the use of pressure tactics, 
such as lockouts, in the collective bargaining relationship.  
V. CONCLUSION 
After analyzing the different laws from Canada and the United States, it is 
obvious that there is concurrent jurisdiction in the application of laws to  
professional sports leagues. Under labor law, Canadian courts and labour  
relations boards have established jurisdiction over professional athletes and 
teams located on Canadian territory. In addition to American antitrust law,  
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Canadian antitrust law applies to professional sports leagues, clubs, and athletes. 
Furthermore, this application must be enforced when teams in the other country 
have an important market power within a league. For example, in professional 
hockey, the seven Canadian hockey clubs have most of the economic power, as 
they generate a large part of the NHL’s revenues. Because concurrent  
jurisdiction is established, in a future lockout, professional sports leagues will 
have to be more careful in declaring a work stoppage because they will want to 
ensure they are complying with Canadian laws. 
While players and players associations have multiple remedies to prevent 
or stop a lockout, the majority of these remedies are ineffective. The remedies 
available are intended to enjoin a lockout or provide players with tools to gain 
leverage in negotiating a new CBA. This is an advantage for a players  
association and players who previously lacked bargaining power in the  
negotiations. Professional sports leagues should be worried and try to look for 
remedies to avoid these concurrent jurisdiction issues. It must be noted that  
labor law claims could be counterbalanced if a league fulfills all of the Canadian 
administrative requirements prior to declaring a lockout. If the requirements are 
fulfilled, a league would eliminate the leverage that a players association gains 
if it is successful in its Canadian labour law claims. With all of the major  
professional sports leagues looking to expand abroad, these jurisdictional issues 
will become the center point of negotiation. The leagues will have to keep in 
mind that, in Europe, as well as in Canada, the system does not give labor  
exemptions like the American system. Ideally, to prevent potential issues, the 
four major professional sports leagues should collaborate with the players  
associations to find ways to prevent potential work stoppage problems. This 
Article proposes that the best way to avoid work stoppage issues is to negotiate 
a process that allows negotiations to continue with the help of an independent 
third party who would reduce the tension between a players association and a 
league. Tribunals are not the best method to regulate the labor relationship in 
professional sports. Therefore, it would be beneficial for both players  
associations and leagues to voluntarily and collaboratively develop a process 
that will leave labor relations in the players associations and leagues’ control, 
or in the hands of an expert in professional sports.  
 
